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ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF LAW FIRM ASSOCIATES
LEONARD GROSS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to provide guidance to law firms
and law firm associates so that they can avoid or resolve satisfacto-
rily certain ethical problems that law firm associates often face.
The ethical problems of the law firm associate differ from the ethi-
cal problems of the law firm partner or the sole practitioner. Each
of the three, as an attorney, is an agent of his respective client and
thus owes fiduciary duties to that client. Each, as an attorney, owes
further duties both to the legal profession as a whole and to the
public at large. Yet the duty of the associate to his law firm, partic-
ularly the duty of obedience to the firm, differs from the duties
and corresponding conflicts of either the law firm partner or the
sole practitioner.
This Article examines the relationship between the associate and
the firm, the duties that the associate owes to the firm, and the
duties that the associate owes to the client and to the public. The
Article suggests a framework within which to analyze the ethical
problems of the law firm associate. The analytical framework re-
quires an identification of the parties that have an interest in the
outcome of the associate's ethical decision. These parties include
the associate, his law firm, the particular client, law firm clients in
general, the legal profession, and society as a whole. This Article
proposes that, in the absence of a statute clearly resolving an asso-
ciate's ethical problem, the courts balance the relative importance
of the interests involved in a particular situation in formulating a
rule to resolve the problem.
Specifically, the analytical framework proposed in this Article
can guide a law firm and a firm associate in handling the following
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representative ethical problems:
(A) purchases by associates of client securities;
(B) moonlighting by associates; and
(C) assignments or instructions in the following areas
which may require an associate to perform an unethi-
cal act:
(1) the handling of a client's case when adequate time
or expertise is lacking; and
(2) the billing of a client.
This Article analyzes these problems under both the current Amer-
ican Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and the proposed ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(adopted by the American Bar Association in August 1983). The
Article criticizes certain deficiencies in the revised ethical stan-
dards of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Ap-
pendix to this Article contains a survey conducted by the author in
which law firm associates were questioned regarding various ethical
problems that they may have encountered. References to the re-
sults of this survey are incorporated throughout the Article.
II. DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE ASSOCIATE IN THE FIRM
This Article adopts the customary use of the term "law firm as-
sociate" to refer to an attorney who is a regular employee of a law
firm.' The law firm typically pays the associate's salary. The over-
head expenses connected with the associate's work are also borne
by the law firm employing the associate.'
As an employer, the law firm has the right to control the associ-
ate in the law firm's business.3 Thus, the associate's superior (here-
1. The Florida Bar v. Fetterman, 439 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1983); In re Sussman, 241 Or.
246, 405 P.2d 355, 356 (1965). See generally ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances, Formal Op. 310 (1963); ABA, THE LAWYERS HANDBOOK § D3-1 (1975). "Associate
counsel" also is used to refer to an attorney who serves as a cocounsel in a particular matter
but who works for a law firm different from the one that employs the principal attorney who
hired him. See Vaughn v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 698, 511 P.2d 1158, 108 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1973).
2. McCarty, Determining the Lawyer's Fee, 1 Law Office Economics and Management
Manual (Callaghan) § 25.0, Article A (June 1981); 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 148
(1980).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958); cf. Odess v. Taylor, 282 Ala. 389,
211 So. 2d 805 (1968) (associate of physician held not to be an employee for purposes of
statute making it unlawful for any contract to restrain one from exercising a lawful profes-
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after referred to as "partner" for convenience) can give the associ-
ate particular assignments. He can direct the associate regarding
the type of work that should be done, how it should be done, and
when it should be done.4
If an associate enters a formal contract with the law firm, the
associate is bound by the terms of that contract.5 Even in the ab-
sence of a formal contract, an associate owes certain duties to the
firm that are implied in law by virtue of the relationship of the
associate to the law firm. The associate, as a regular employee of a
law firm, is generally subject to the partner's control, or at least to
the partner's right to control. Thus, the associate fits within the
legal classification of an "agent."'7 The associate also fits within the
legal classification of a "servant," 8 a particular kind of agent who is
subject to more of the principal's control than is a nonservant. e
Because the partner is an agent of both the law firm ° and the cli-
ent," the associate also fits within the definition of "sub-agent"
sion but excluding "employees" from protection of the statute). The court in Odess based
its holding on the employer's failure to retain the right to direct either the manner in which
work was to be done or the result to be accomplished. Id.
4. See, E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 141-70 (1969); 2 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 2167 (1914). The law firm has the discretion to determine the associ-
ates that it will assign to particular cases, which allows the firm to minimize potential con-
flicts. Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa. Commw. 295,
361 A.2d 497, 503 (1976).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 376-77 (1958); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREG-
ORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 65, at 120 (1979). Because of the transaction costs that are
involved in negotiating and drafting a contract, most employment contracts, including those
between law firm partners and associates, are not in writing. If either the partner or associ-
ate wants an agreement that would differ significantly from the implied agreement created
by the doctrines of agency and contract, it could be in that person's interest to have a
written contract. If it is anticipated that the relationship will last for an extended time
either because the associate will become difficult to replace or because the job market will
become limited, the value of a written agreement can exceed the transaction costs. See W.
KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE - LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1980).
6. See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 66, at 120.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958). Although the term "servant" suggests
only individuals employed at menial or manual labor, the Restatement includes within the
definition of "servant" even individuals purporting to exercise intelligence rather than mus-
cle. Id. § 2 comment c.
9. Id. § 2; W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 74 (1949).
10. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 (1969).
11. See Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 1973).
1985]
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given in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 2
A. The Legal Duties of the Associate to the Law Firm
As both a servant and a sub-agent, the associate owes fiduciary
obligations to the law firm consistent with those that servants and
agents traditionally have owed to principals. 3 Thus, the law firm
associate owes the following duties, among others, to the law firm
by which he is employed: good care and skill,14 loyalty" and
obedience."6
1. The Duty of Good Care
An agent impliedly warrants to his principal that he possesses
the requisite skill and experience ordinarily required to perform
the service." He also promises to exercise reasonable care, skill,
and diligence in serving the principal.' The law firm associate, as a
servant of the firm, warrants to the law firm that he possesses and
will exercise the skill of the ordinary attorney.' An attorney with a
particular speciality, such as a patent attorney, warrants to the law
firm employing him that he will practice his specialty with the
knowledge and skill of an ordinary attorney in his specialty.2" If
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(1) (1958).
13. See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, §§ 65-69; see also Evans, Fiduciary
Obligations of Agents, 2 CASE W. RES. 5 (1950).
14. See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 66; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958); F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 525 (4th ed.
1952); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 147-53 (1964).
15. See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 68; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98 (1958); F. MECHEM, supra note 14, §§ 500-06.
16. See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 69; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958); F. MECHEM, supra note 14, § 515; W. SEAVEY, supra note 14,
§ 145.
17. F. MECHEM, supra note 14, § 524.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 525. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to
act with standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for
the kind of work which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise
any special skill that he has.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958).
20. See Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975); Rodriguez v.
Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 622 P.2d 261 (1980); Isham v. Post, 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E. 1084 (1894);
Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279 (1979); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL
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the associate is negligent, his employer, the law firm, will be liable
to the client who is injured by the associate's negligence.2' If the
law firm is liable to the client because of the associate's negligence,
the firm may obtain indemnity from the associate for its loss.22
MALPRACTICE § 253 (2d. ed. 1981); F. MECHEM, supra note 14, § 525; Isaacs, Liability of the
Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 39, 39-40 (1935); cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 162 n.48 (4th ed. 1971) (authorities cited are malpractice cases
against doctors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1976); see also Blaustein, Lia-
bility of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 BROOKLYN L. REV. 233, 254-58
(1953) (suggests that the trend will be to hold attorney-specialists to a higher standard of
care than general practitioners, but that the cases as yet do not support such a distinction);
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 776-77 (1959).
21. Walker v. Stevens, 79 Ill. 193 (1875); see Lefkowitz v. Napacto, Inc., 51 N.Y. 2d 434,
438, 415 N.E. 2d 916, 918, 434 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (1980); Assurance Co. of America v. Pulin,
142 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (N.Y. App. Term 1955) ("[A]n attorney must assume responsibility
for documents prepared by an employee or associate concerning a matter handled by the
attorney ... ."); D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 18.11
(1980); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, § 35; W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, § 156(B); E.
THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 294 (1914); see also Mahoney v. County of Middlesex, 14
Mass. 459, 11 N.E. 689 (1887); In re McGuinness, 69 A.D. 606, 74 N.Y.S. 1054 (1902); Young
v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968).
In negligence actions against the law firm, vicarious liability is a misnomer because the
law firm is never really free of blame. The law firm warrants to the client that it will super-
vise the work of the associate and that it will make the important decisions. In re Neimark,
13 A.D.2d 676, 214 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1961); see Moore v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 74, 396 P.2d 577,
41 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1964); In re Schelly, 94 Ill. 2d 234, 446 N.E.2d 236 (1983). Neimark,
Moore, and Schelly all involved incidents where an attorney was disciplined for employing
an incompetent or disbarred attorney. Therefore, the law firm's liability arises not merely
from its having employed an associate who was negligent, but also from its own negligence.
See W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, §§ 156(B), 156(D). The Restatement (Second) of Agency
provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is responsible to the principal for the con-
duct of a subservant or other subagent with reference to the principal's affairs
entrusted to the sub-agent, as the agent is for his own conduct; and as to other
matters, as a principal is for the conduct of a servant or other agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 406 (1958).
A law firm associate is a subagent of the firm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5
comment c (1958); see H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 8D. (A subagent need
not be a servant of the agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5 comment c.)
Therefore, under section 406 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, the law firm is liable
to the client for the negligence of the associate in matters entrusted to the associate by the
law firm. Cf. Fitzgerald v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 73, 83, 569 P.2d 763, 768, 141 Cal. Rptr. 169,
174 (1977) (in disciplinary proceeding, law firm partner had to accept responsibility for ac-
tions of associates whom he was supposed to be supervising). The law firm will also be liable
on the basis of apparent authority to one whom it clothes with the appearance of associate
status if the latter gives negligent advice to a third person. In re Sacks, 21 A.D.2d 483, 251
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1964).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399 (1958). Lawsuits between associates and
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2. The Duty of Loyalty
A law firm associate owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to his law
firm.23 In all matters connected with his employment, the associate
has a duty to act for the firm's benefit rather than for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another party whose interests are ad-
verse to those of the firm.24 In other words, absent the law firm's
permission, the associate is not free to compete with his law firm
for business.25 Thus, while employed by the firm, the associate can-
not attempt to lure a client away from the firm or try to convince
the client to employ him personally as an attorney.26
In some instances the associate's duty of loyalty to the law firm
survives the termination of his employment. An associate's duty of
loyalty prevents him from leaving his law firm and then employing
high pressure tactics to solicit the clients of his former employer.
However, except for an agreement made in connection with the
law firms are virtually nonexistent, in part because malpractice insurance policies cover both
the partners and the associates at the law firm. See Berry, Professional Liability Insurance
Policies, 20 L. OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 499, 502 (1980); see also R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 20, § 706.
23. A law firm associate fits the Restatement definition of a subagent. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF AGENCY § 5 (1958). Section 428(2) of the Restatement specifically provides that
"[u]nless otherwise agreed, a subagent owes the agent the duties of an agent to his princi-
pal." Id.; see, e.g., Estergard Eberhardt & Ackerman v. Carragher, 105 Ill. App. 3d 816, 820,
434 N.E.2d 1185, 1187-88 (1982). Under section 387 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
an agent owes a "duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all
matters connected with the agency." Therefore, pursuant to section 428(2), a law firm asso-
ciate owes a duty of loyalty to the law firm. See also F. MECHEM, supra note 14, §§ 500-06;
H. REUSEHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 68; W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, §§ 147-53.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958). Of course, the associate owes a
different duty to the client of the law firm on whose behalf he is working. See infra text
accompanying notes 40-53.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1958).
26. Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175
(1978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
27. Id. at 435-36, 393 A.2d at 1185; see D.C. Bar Ethics Committee, Op. 77 (1979). In
opinion 77, a contractual clause requiring an associate to pay his former law firm a fee of
$4000 plus bonuses for each year of employment "if, within three years of termination, he or
anyone under his direction or control directly and personally, solicits any of the clients of
the firm OTHER THAN BY THE MAILING OF A PRINTED ANNOUNCEMENT CON-
TEMPLATED BY THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" was held not to
violate the Canons of Ethics. Id. (emphasis in original). The Ethics Committee refused to
speculate whether a court would enforce such a provision. Id; see infra text accompanying
notes 102-23.
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payment of retirement benefits, a restrictive covenant limiting an
associate's right to practice law after leaving the law firm consti-
tutes a violation of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct.28
Courts also have refused to enforce such covenants on the ground
that they violate Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.29
The duty of loyalty owed by the associate to the law firm also
encompasses the duty to refrain from making use of confidential
information for the associate's own benefit. For example, if an as-
sociate acquires inside information about an impending tender of-
fer and purchases shares of stock from the target company, his
conduct would violate his duty of loyalty to the law firm.30 The
associate's conduct also would constitute a violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of SEC Rule 10b-
5.31
Similarly, the associate's duty of loyalty prevents him from dis-
closing confidential information that he learned at the law firm,
even if he has no profit motive for the disclosure.32 For example,
28. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1983); see Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d
498 (1975), afl'd, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (1975); Note, Attorneys Must Not Enter
into Partnership Agreements Prohibiting Themselves from Representing Former Clients
Upon Termination of the Partnership, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 663 P.2d 1285, pet. denied, 295 Or. 541, 668
P.2d 384 (1983) (restrictive covenant in partnership agreement that conditioned the with-
drawing partner's right to certain payments on his not practicing in certain geographic area
held to be unenforceable because the covenant violated DR 2-108(A)).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 comment c (1958); see also F. MECHEM,
supra note 14, § 504; cf. Gower v. Andrews, 59 Cal. 119 (1881) (accounting clerk who used
information from employer's books to procure a lease for himself was required to return the
property to his employer); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (corporation recovered profits made by president and chairman of the
board from inside information); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 68; W. SEA-
VEY, supra note 14, § 148(B). But cf. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 192, 195 (7th Cir.
1978); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 811 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857
(1977).
31. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1982); SEC Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Compare infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text
with Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (printer employed by financial printing
firm who used inside information to purchase shares of target company in a corporate take-
over bid held not in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 be-
cause he was not a corporate insider or fiduciary).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958); W. SEAVEY, supra note 14,
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internal firm policies regarding the billing of clients usually are
confidential. Many disclosures by an associate about the firm's bill-
ing policies would violate the associate's duty of loyalty.
3. The Duty of Obedience
An associate is also under an obligation to obey all reasonable
instructions of the law firm regarding the manner of performance
of his job.33 Unlike a partner, an associate, as a servant of the law
firm, owes a duty of obedience to the law firm and to each part-
ner.3 4 For example, an associate might view as unfair an assign-
ment by a law firm partner on a Friday afternoon requiring the
associate to work all weekend.3 5 Nevertheless, the associate has a
duty to obey the partner and perform the assignment. Obviously, if
the associate feels that such assignments occur too frequently in
light of the compensation he is receiving, he has the option of seek-
ing another job.
When an associate is privileged to protect his own or another's
interest, he need not obey the instructions of a law firm partner.36
Thus, an associate instructed to perform an unethical act is under
an ethical obligation not to comply. For example, if the partner
instructs the associate to initiate a frivolous law suit, the associate
should disobey the instructions of the partner and adhere to the
dictates of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2) and Ethical Considera-
§ 152.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 41958); see also F. MECHEM, supra note
14, § 515; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 69; W. SEAVEY, supra note 14,
§ 145.
34. A partner, however, does not have to obey the commands of another partner. In the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, all partners have an equal voice in the manage-
ment of the partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e) (1969). If differences arise
among the partners over ordinary matters connected with the operation of the partnership,
the decision is made by a majority of the partners' vote. See id. § 18(h). Like an associate, a
law firm partner owes a fiduciary obligation to the law partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNER-
SHIP ACT § 21 (1969); see also J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 68 (1968);
H. REUSCHLEIN AND W. GREGORY, supra note 5, § 188; Beane, The Fiduciary Relationship
of a Partner, 5 J. CORP. L. 483 (1980). The fiduciary duties of a partner are not identical
with those of an associate. See Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IOWA L. REV. 902, 917
(1963).
35. See generally P. HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREETS 129-30 (1973); E. SMIGEL, supra
note 4, 239-43.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385(2) (1958).
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tion 7-4, both of which render such conduct unethical.37 Moreover,
the firing of an associate because he refuses to follow unethical law
firm instructions has been construed by at least one commentator
as a violation of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct.38 In
some states such a firing also may give rise to a civil cause of
action. 9
B. The Duties the Associate Owes to the Client and to the Public
In addition to the fiduciary duties that the associate owes to his
law firm, the associate has other responsibilities. He owes a fiduci-
ary duty to the client on whose behalf he is working. His duty to
the client is much the same as if he were the attorney in charge of
the representation. The bases for this responsibility can be found
in the law of agency and in the attorney's professional duty to the
client as set forth in the various codes of professional responsibil-
ity. In many situations, the associate also has a duty to the public,
or at least to a segment of the public.
1. The Duty to the Law Firm Client
Unlike the law firm, the associate has no contractual relationship
with the client. If the associate knows the identity of the client,
however, the associate is an agent of the client" under principles
of agency, and therefore owes the. same duties to the client that the
law firm itself owes to the client.4 Thus, when the associate knows
the identity of the client, the associate owes a fiduciary duty to
that client.42
The law of agency provides the basis for determining the poten-
37. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981); Id. EC 7-4.
38. Levinson, Book Review, 36 VAND. L. REV. 847, 853 (1983) (reviewing D. EWING, Do IT
MY WAY OR YOU'RE FIRED (1983)); see infra text accompanying notes 167-70. As a practical
matter, the associate runs the risk that the law firm will find a pretext upon which to dis-
charge him. See D. EWING, supra, at 98.
39. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
40. See W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, § 7C.
41. Pollack v. Lytle, 120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 942-43, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81, 87 (1981). The Re-
statement (Second) of Agency provides: "Unless otherwise agreed, a subagent who knows of
the existence of the ultimate principal owes him the duties owed by an agent to a principal,
except the duties dependent upon the existence of a contract." RESTATEMENT SECOND OF
AGENCY § 428(1) (1958).
42. Pollack v. Lytle, 120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 942-43, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81, 87 (1981).
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tial civil liability both of the associate and of the law firm to the
client for the associate's conduct. If the associate is negligent, the
client initially bears the burden of the associate's negligence in
much the same way that he bears the burden of the law firm's neg-
ligence. For example, the failure of an associate to prosecute dili-
gently an action on behalf of a client could produce the same result
as the failure of a law firm partner to prosecute-dismissal of the
action.43 Of course, the client subsequently can bring an action
against the associate and the law firm for malpractice. 44 The asso-
ciate and the partner are jointly and severally liable in a malprac-
tice action."
A basis for the associate's duty to the client also arises from the
applicable codes of professional responsibility. The ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, as enacted by the various
states, applies to all members of the legal profession, regardless of
the nature of their professional activities." An attorney who vio-
lates the disciplinary rules is subject to disciplinary action.47 The
Code, however, does not purport to impose civil liability on the
attorney," and the courts generally have not provided civil reme-
dies for violation of the disciplinary rules of the Code.4 9 Under the
43. E.g., Sortino v. Fisher, 20 A.D.2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186, 192 (1963). But see Wagen-
knecht v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 97 A.D.2d 407, 467 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1983) (indicat-
ing that the recently enacted section 2005 to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
see N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW & RULES § 2005 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984), gives courts
greater discretion in excusing delay or default resulting from law office failure).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 406-428 (1958); see supra note 21 and accompa-
nying text.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217A comment a (1958).
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1981); In re Meeker 76 N.M.
354, 357, 414 P.2d 862, 864 (1966), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 449 (1967);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 203 (1940) ("The Canons of
this Association govern all its members irrespective of the nature of their practice, and the
application of the Canons is not affected by statutes or regulations governing certain activi-
ties of lawyers which may prescribe less stringent standards.").
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981). In states
which have adopted their own separate ethical standards, an attorney may be disciplined for
violating those rules. See, e.g., Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 603, 510 P.2d 719, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 359 (1973).
48. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981); R. MAL-
LEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, § 256.
49. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383-84 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.
1978); Greening v. Klamen, 652 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. App. 1983); see MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20,
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the associate owes the
client many of the same duties that he owes the client under the
law of agency. Specifically, the associate owes the client the duty to
act competently,50 to avoid conflicts of interest,51 and to keep the
client's secrets. 2
The fact that the law firm is satisfied that the associate has com-
plied with the duty of good care does not necessarily mean that the
work will satisfy the client. The associate owes both the law firm
and the client a duty to act competently on their behalf. For a
number of reasons, including its responsibilities to other clients,
the small size of the case, or the small size of the prospective fee,
the law firm might instruct the associate that only a minimal
amount of work is needed or that the research prepared by the
associate is adequate.53 However, if the work prepared by the asso-
§§ 67, 256.
Voluntary compliance with the standards of professional conduct has been poor.
Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND RESEARCH J. 953, 958.
Moreover, even the threat of discipline has done little to raise the perceived level of attor-
ney conduct. Enforcement has proved weakest in the areas of greatest concern to clients:
inattention, incompetence, delay, mishandling of client property, and fee abuses. Marks &
Catheart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation? 1974 U. ILL. L.F.
193. For these reasons, commentators have suggested that the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility should serve as a basis for creating liability for attorneys in civil proceedings. See,
e.g., Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement,
1980 AM. B. FOUND RESEARCH J. 939, 946-47; Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REv. 281 (1979).
Indeed, in many cases, evidence of the violation of a disciplinary rule has been used to help
define not only the scope of ordinary skill and care but also the parameters of fiduciary
obligations. R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 20, § 256; Wolfram, supra, at 303-19.
50. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY Canon 6 & DR 6-601 (1981).
51. Id. Canon 5 & DR 5-101 to 5-105 (1981).
52. Id. Canon 4 & DR 4-101 (1981). The duty imposed by Canon 4 to keep a client's
secrets may place an associate who has switched law firms in an uncomfortable position. If
an associate works for client X in the case of X v. Y, and then joins another firm that is
representing Y in X v. Y, there is a possibility that both the associate and the new law firm
will be disqualified from representing Y in X v. Y.
53. The problem of the attorney's economic interest in a case is particularly severe when
a contingent fee is involved. See N. GALSTON, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER
115, 126 (1977) (reproducing a seminar entitled Ethical Problems Faced by the Estate Prac-
titioner, Feb. 19, 1975); M. PIRSIG & K. KIRWIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 265-81 (West
1976); Grady, Some Ethical Questions about Percentage Fees, 2 LITMGATMON 20, 27 (Summer
1976).
Contingency fees are proper in most civil cases in the United States, MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1981), although they are used predominantly in tort
cases. The principal justification for a contingency fee is that it enables individuals who
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ciate does not satisfy the client, and if the amount and quality of
the work do not measure up to the standards of the ordinary attor-
ney in the community, both the associate and the law firm would
be liable to the client for malpractice.
2. The Duty to the Public
The common law imposes no fiduciary duty on the associate to
the public.5 4 Under the law of agency, a fiduciary duty arises from
a consensual relationship between a principal and an agent.5 5 In
would otherwise not be able to afford counsel to obtain services of a competent attorney to
prosecute their claim. Id. EC 2-20 (1981). One commonly cited disadvantage of the contin-
gency fee arrangement is that a contingency fee may turn out to be much higher than a flat
fee. See Kohlman, An Equitable Contingency Fee Contract, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 268 (1975). In
cases handled on a contingency fee basis, the amount of time and effort that a law firm
spends on a particular matter often will be directly proportional to its perception of the
likelihood of recovery in the case and the potential size of that recovery. A law firm will not
want to spend an excessive amount of time and energy on a case in which it is not likely to
prevail or in which it is not likely to sustain a large recovery because the amount that the
firm will earn is tied directly to the amount of the recovery.
54. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, § 40. Attorneys, however, can be liable to
nonclients for common law causes of action as well as for violations of statutes when the
nonclients are directly affected by the attorney's conduct. Some of the most common causes
of action for which attorneys have been held liable to nonclients include fraud, see, e.g.,
Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 449
U.S. 981 (1980); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, § 43, negligent misrepresentation,
see Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1976); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, § 44, malicious prosecution, see, e.g., Wong v.
Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. App. 1981); Deville v. Zaunbrecher, 401 So. 2d 643 (La. Ct.
App. 1981); Fried v. Bower & Gardner, 46 N.Y.2d 765, 386 N.E.2d 258, 413 N.Y.S.2d 650
(1978); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, §§ 45-60, and abuse of process, id. § 61. In
addition, attorneys have been held liable to third persons in the absence of privity, usually
on a third party beneficiary theory. See generally id. § 80. For example, beneficiaries under
a will have successfully sued attorneys on negligence claims. Compare Stowe v. Smith, 184
Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981) with Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 14, 440 N.E.2d 96
(1982).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra
note 5, §§ 2-4; W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, § 3. Under an estoppel theory, an agency relation-
ship can exist in the absence of express consent. Agency by estoppel can exist if a third
person has been misled or has relied to his detriment on the appearance of an agency rela-
tionship if the appearance of agency was either intentionally or carelessly caused by the
principal. An agency by estoppel also can exist when the presumed principal is aware that
third persons mistakenly believe that an agency relationship exists and will change their
positions because of it and when the presumed principal fails to notify them of the true
facts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (1958); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra
note 5, § 25; W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, § 8(E).
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short, under the common law, the associate's occupation creates no
special duty for the associate vis-a-vis the general public. 6
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility is an ethi-
cal norm by which attorneys can judge the propriety of their con-
duct.57 When the Code is passed by a state legislature or adopted
by a court, it has the full force of law and establishes an ethical
obligation on the part of attorneys toward the general public. 5 8
Most federal district courts give effect to the Code, as promulgated
by the ABA or as enacted by a given state. 9 Finally, many other
statutory duties are imposed on attorneys to protect the public.6
56. Of course, an associate can be liable in tort for negligently running over a pedestrian,
and his firm can be liable under respondeat superior if the associate was acting in the course
of his employment. In this situation, the associate's liability to the public does not rest on
any fiduciary duty that he owes to the public. Instead, his duty is to drive as would a rea-
sonable and prudent driver-the same duty owed by any driver to the public. Moreover,
there are many statutes that impose a duty on the attorney for reasons other than his pro-
fession. For example, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(b) (1982), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), prohibit anyone from trading in
stock with inside information that was obtained from a confidential relationship. See Dirks
v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
57. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY Preliminary Statement (1981); see Peo-
ple ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 590, 173 N.E. 827, 831 (1930) ("The
American and the State Bar Associations are not legislative tribunals, and their canons of
ethics are not of binding obligation and are not enforced as such by the courts, although
they constitute a safe guide for professional conduct in the cases to which they apply, and
an attorney may be disciplined by this court for not observing them."); Hull v. Celanese
Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975); see also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHicS 26-30
(1953).
58. H. DRINKER, supra note 57, at 27 n.25.
59. See Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
94 HARv. L. REV. 1244, 1249 nn.18 & 19 (1981). For example, General Rule 4(f) of the
Southern District of New York provides:
Any member of the bar of this court who is guilty of fraud, deceit, malpractice;
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; conduct violative of the
Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association or of any
violation of a Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility of
the New York State Bar Association; or any other conduct unbecoming of a
member of the bar of this court; may be disbarred, suspended or censured.
60. States have established statutory requirements for admission to practice, see, e.g., Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 703 (1983), and have placed restrictions on attorney advertising, see,
e.g., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 603.22 (1983) (rules for the Appellate Division, First De-
partment). Thirteen states also have established continuing education requirements that at-
torneys must fulfill in order to continue practicing. See Domash, Does Illinois Need
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education? Why It's Necessary, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Apr.
28, 1984, at 7, col. 1.; see also Rules of the Supreme Court for Continuing Legal Education
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The associate's duty to the public under the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility is basically the same as the duty of all at-
torneys to the public. The canons of the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility that most directly focus on the attorney's
obligation to the general public are Canons One, Two, Three, and
Nine. According to these Canons, a lawyer should assist in main-
taining the integrity and competence of the legal profession, assist
the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available, assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law,
and avoid the appearance of professional impropriety."
In certain instances, the associate's role in the firm imposes ethi-
cal obligations on the associate that differ from the obligations im-
posed on partners and sole practitioners. For example, pursuant to
Canon Two of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
Ethical Consideration 2-25, all lawyers have a responsibility to see
that indigents receive legal services. Ethical Consideration 2-25
urges that every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or
workload, find the time to help provide legal services to the poor.
The associate's ability to comply with this ethical consideration
could be severely impaired by the amount of work given to him by
the law firm. For this reason, it is necessary to reconcile the associ-
ate's obligation to the law firm with his duties to the client and to
the public.6 2
of Members of the Bar, Rule 3, MINN. STAT. ANN. vol. 52, at 592 (West 1980).
61. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1981) ("A lawyer should
assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession."); id. Canon 2
("A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel avail-
able."); id. Canon 3 ("A lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of
law."); id. Canon 9 ("A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropri-
ety."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 comment (1983) ("A law-
yer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has
no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts."). But cf. Virzi v. Grand
Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (plaintiff's attor-
ney in a personal injury action had an ethical obligation to inform both the court and the
opposing counsel that plaintiff had died prior to the attorneys concluding a settlement).
62. Ethical Considerations are only aspirational in character. See MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981). Consequently, the associate's obli-
gation in the given example can be more readily ascertained than it could be if there were a
potential conflict between the Disciplinary Rules and the partner's instruction to the associ-
ate because Disciplinary Rules are mandatory. See id.
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III. THE COURTS AND THE ABA: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
TO RESOLVE ETHICAL PROBLEMS
An associate has ethical responsibilities to his firm, the client,
the legal profession, and the public in general.63 An associate and
his law firm also have financial interests that may affect their per-
ception of their ethical obligations. In many instances, these inter-
ests conflict. Resort to one set of rules, such as the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, often will not help the associate re-
solve an ethical dilemma created by the conflicting interests. In-
stead, determining the exact scope of the associate's ethical duties
requires a balancing of the competing interests. Frequently, a com-
promise between the competing interests is appropriate. At other
times, one entity's interests may so greatly outweigh another en-
tity's interests that the associate must comply with the ethical dic-
tates of the entity with the greater interest. As seen below in Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corporation,64 in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney disquali-
fication, 65 and in Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Ep-
stein,6 the courts and the ABA have, in many instances, resolved
associates' ethical problems by balancing the competing interests
involved.
A. Attorney Disqualification and the New Firm
1. Silver Chrysler Plymouth
When an associate leaves one law firm to join another, the fol-
lowing question often arises: should the associate's new law firm be
able to represent client X if the associate's former law firm repre-
sented a client whose interests were adverse to those of X, al-
though the associate did not substantially participate in the re-
63. See generally Morgan, The Evolving Concepts of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) (arguing that the current Code of Professional Responsibility con-
sistently inverts the proper ranking of interests because it places the interests of the attor-
ney above those of the client and the public).
64. 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d. Cir. 1975).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.9, 1.10 & Rule 1.10 comment (1983).
66. 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 442 U.S. 907
(1979).
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lated matter at his former law firm? 7
In a landmark case, T.C. & Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc. ,6 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York faced a similar issue. The attorney had repre-
sented a motion picture theatre operator who was suing a motion
picture distributor in an antitrust proceeding; the attorney had
previously represented the distributor in a related government an-
titrust proceeding.69 As a prophylactic measure, the court ruled
that, because the movant had shown that the former representa-
tion was substantially related to the second representation, the
need to safeguard the secrets and confidences previously disclosed
to the attorney required that the attorney be disqualified. 70 How-
67. It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt an exhaustive analysis of the confus-
ing and often contradictory case law involving attorney disqualification. See generally Lieb-
man, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 NW.
U. L. REV. 976 (1979); Note, Attorney's Conflicts of Interests: Representation of Interests
Adverse to that of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61 (1975); Note, Motions to Disqualify
Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57 TEx. L. REV. 726 (1979).
Attorney disqualification cases are discussed in this article for the purpose of demonstrating
the utility of an interest-balancing analysis of associates' ethical problems.
68. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
69. Id. at 266-67.
70. In explaining the "substantially related" test in T. C. & Theatre Corp., Judge Wein-
feld stated:
[T]he former client need show no more than that the matters embraced within
the pending suit wherein his former attorney appeared on behalf of his adver-
sary are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the
attorney previously represented him, the former client. The Court will assume
that during the course of the former representation, confidences were disclosed
to the attorney bearing on the subject matter of the representation. It will not
inquire into their nature and extent. . . . [T]he court must ask whether it can
reasonably be said that in the course of the former representation the attorney
might have acquired information related to the subject of his subsequent rep-
resentation. If so, then the relationship between the two matters is sufficiently
close to bring the later representation within the prohibition of Canon 6.
Id. at 268-69.
Modern code provisions governing both confidentiality, see Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4-101 (1981), and independence of professional judgment, see id. DR 5-
105(A) & (B), derive from the former Canon Six to which Judge Weinfeld refers. AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, at 225 nn.35
& 226.
Absent a showing of a "substantial relationship," the party seeking disqualification must
prove the prior acquisition of pertinent financial information. In view of the difficulty of
obtaining such evidence, motions for disqualification will generally fail absent a showing of a
"substantial relationship." Note, Attorney's Conflicts of Interest: Representation of Inter-
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ever, the attorney with whom the disqualified attorney was associ-
ated was not disqualified from proceeding with the lawsuit against
the distributor. 7' The court was unwilling to presume that the as-
sociated attorney had obtained confidences, and a review of the
record did not lead the court to draw such an inference. 2
The next major development in this area was to impute the
knowledge of the attorney representing the first client to other
members of the new firm with which the attorney had become affil-
iated, causing the disqualification of the new firm.73 Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(D) was frequently the basis for imputing knowledge to
the members of the new law firm.74 Rule 5-105(D) requires a part-
ner or associate either to refuse to accept or to withdraw from em-
ployment if any other member of the law firm is required to refuse
to accept or to withdraw from employment pursuant to a Discipli-
nary Rule.75 According to an ABA Formal Opinion interpreting
est Adverse to that of Former Client, supra note 67, at 75 nn.70-71.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) also has been invoked to prevent an attorney from switching
sides to the detriment of his former client on any matter in which the former client confided
in the attorney. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1981); see E. F.
Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 394 (S.D. Tex. 1969). One court has held that
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) requires disqualification when the plaintiff establishes "'(1) the
former representation, (2) a substantial relation between the subject matter of the former
representation and the issues in the later lawsuit, and (3) the later adverse representation.'"
Marketti v. Fitzimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
71. 113 F. Supp. at 272.
72. Id. at 271-72.
73. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir.
1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1977);
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Corp., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978). In Weber, the court stated:
IT]he court need not, indeed cannot, inquire whether the lawyer did, in fact,
receive confidential information during his previous employment which might
be used to the client's disadvantage. Such an inquiry would prove destructive
of the weighty policy considerations that serve as the pillars of Canon 4 of the
Code, for the client's ultimate and compelled response to an attorney's claim of
non-access would necessarily be to describe in detail the confidential informa-
tion previously disclosed and now sought to be preserved.
566 F.2d at 608 (emphasis in original) (quoting Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973)).
74. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITy DR 5-105(D) (1981); see American Can
Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971); Reaco Services, Inc. v. Holt, 479
F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1979); G.A.C. Commercial Corp. v. Mahoney Typographers, 66
Mich. App. 186, 190, 238 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1975).
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1981).
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Rule 5-105(d), "'The relations of partners in a law firm are so
close that the firm, and all the members thereof, are barred from
accepting any employment, that any one member of the firm is
prohibited from taking.' "76
A second basis for automatically disqualifying the attorney's new
firm frequently has been the need to avoid the appearance of im-
propriety pursuant to Canon Nine and Disciplinary Rule 9-101.77
In the decisions relying on these provisions the associate was
treated in the same manner as the law firm partner: if the associate
had previously worked on a substantially related matter that was
adverse to client X, the associate's new law firm could not re-
present client X even if the associate himself did not work on the
matter at his new law firm. 78
Another landmark decision in the field of attorney disqualifica-
tion was Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corpo-
76. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
105 comment, at 246 (1979) (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 33 (1931)). The possibility that a court will impute the associate's knowledge to
the firm and disqualify the firm has important implications for the associate's ability to
moonlight. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
77. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101 (1981); see, e.g., American
Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971); Laskey Bros. of W. Va., Inc.
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932
(1956); Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (D. Conn. 1974).
78. See, supra note 77. More recently, in situations where the associate worked for the
former firm on a "substantially related" matter, some courts, including the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have held that the presumption in favor of dis-
qualifying the associate's new firm can be rebutted. See Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instru-
ment Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982). Other recent Seventh Circuit cases adopting a
similar approach, but not involving the movement of an associate from one firm to another,
include Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle National Bank v.
County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983); and Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v.
Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); see also Lemaire
v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308, 1309-10 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
For a good discussion of attorney disqualification cases, see Peterson, Rebuttable Pre-
sumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious
Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 399 (1984). District courts in
the Seventh Circuit are now required to make specific factual determinations on the issue of
whether the presumption has been rebutted, unless the new law firm has no "institutional
mechanism" to prevent the new associate from spreading confidences to his new firm. Id. at
407. In Freeman, the district court was instructed that it could rely on such factors as "the
size of the law firm, the area of specialization of the attorney, the attorney's position in the
firm, and the demeanor and credibility of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing." 689 F.2d at
723.
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ration.9 In Silver Chrysler, the defendant, Chrysler Motors
(Chrysler), moved to disqualify counsel for plaintiff, Hammond &
Schreiber, P.C., because Dale Schreiber of that firm had worked on
certain matters for Chrysler while an associate with the law firm of
Kelly, Drye, Warren, Clark, Carr, & Ellis (Kelly Drye).80 The dis-
trict court refused to disqualify plaintiff's counsel,"' and the deci-
sion was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 2
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit considered Schrei-
ber's duty to Chrysler to maintain Chrysler's confidences and
secrets pursuant to Canon Four of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.8" The Second Circuit held that the district court
was correct in concluding that Schreiber had rebutted any pre-
sumption arising from the mere fact of his former employment at
Kelly Drye that he possessed confidences that could be used
against Chrysler.8 4 In reaching this decision, the court reasoned
that there was no basis for distinguishing between partners and
associates on the basis of title alone.8 5 However, it recognized that
at least in large firms associates are less likely to be heavily in-
volved in the factual context of a suit and are more likely to have
some limited involvement related solely to legal questions.8 ' The
court added that "[t]his is not to say that young attorneys in large
firms never become important figures in certain matters but
merely to recognize that some of their work is often of a far more
limited variety. "87
The court also considered whether the duty to avoid the appear-
ance of impropriety under Canon Nine should cause a disqualifica-
79. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 752.
81. 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 754-57.
84. Id. at 757.
85. Id. at 756.
86. Id. at 756-57; accord Fund of Funds, Ltd v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84,
97-98 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Gas-
A-Tron v. Union Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976); Bonus Oil Co. v. American Petro Co., No. CU-73-L-165 (D. Neb., May 1, 1975);
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., [1974-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,392, at t 98,278 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975).
87. 518 F.2d at 757.
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:259
tion of Schreiber and his firm."8 The court reasoned that even a
cynical public would realize that an associate's mere employment
by a large law firm would not automatically result in his exposure
to confidential information in every case that the firm was han-
dling. 9 The court also noted that Canon Nine should not override
the delicate balance created both by Canon Four and by the deci-
sions interpreting that Canon.90 Also relevant, but of lesser impor-
tance in resolving the issue of whether Canon Nine required a per
se disqualification, was the importance of allowing the client to ob-
tain counsel of his choice.91
88. Id. Although many if not most courts that have considered the issue have refused to
disqualify an attorney on the sole basis of Canon Nine and the appearance of impropriety, a
few courts have done just that. Compare Board of Educ. of the City of New York v. Ny-
quist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) ("appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a
reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest of cases"); International
Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975); Society for Good Will to
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); City of Cleveland
v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 205-06 (N.D. Ohio), afl'd., 573 F.2d
1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) with Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1978); Schloetter v. Riloc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d
706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir.
1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975); W. E. Bassett Co. v. H. C.
Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962) (per
curiam); see generally Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study
of the Federal Judiciary Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243 (1981); O'Toole,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MAR-
QUETTE L. REv. 313 (1979).
One commentator has suggested that the courts should not use the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a guide in deciding disqualification cases. See Lindgren, Toward a New
Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 421. Lindgren has sug-
gested that courts should restrict disqualifications "to situations where continued represen-
tation would tend to taint the underlying trial by upsetting the balance of presentations."
Id. at 423.
89. 518 F.2d at 757; accord Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); see also Kramer, supra note 88.
90. 518 F.2d at 757.
91. 518 F.2d at 757 (the court stated: "As in Emle [Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1973)], we recognize 'our responsibility to preserve a balance,
delicate though it may be, between an individual's right to his own freely chosen counsel
and the need to maintain the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility.' "). Id.
at 753; accord Malamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1979);
Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976); Realco Services, Inc. v.
Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 872 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F.
Supp. 865, 874 (W.D. Wis. 1977); see also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.
1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
It should be noted that attorney disqualification motions are often made for the tactical
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In its decision, the district court recognized the need to allow
law firms to obtain highly trained and specialized attorneys from
large law firms without fear of being disqualified merely because
the associate's former firm had represented a client with a conflict-
ing interest, regardless of whether the associate had obtained confi-
dential information.92 The district court also noted the need to
avoid restricting the mobility of young attorneys."
2. The ABA Model Rules
On August 2, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted a new
set of ethical standards known as the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.9 4 The Model Rules now represent official ABA policy, but
reason of attempting to eliminate counsel most familiar with the case and thereby dis-
advantaging the other side. See, e.g., id.; Lindgren, supra note 88, at 440 n.86.
92. 370 F. Supp. 581, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), a/I'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); accord City
of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210-11 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd,
573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); E. SMIGEL, supra note 4, at
234.
93. 370 F. Supp. at 589-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d at 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975); ac-
cord City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210-11 (N.D.
Ohio), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). See generally
E. SMIGEL, supra note 4, at 234; Liebman, supra note 67; Note, Attorney's Conflicts of In-
terests: Representation of Interests Adverse to That of Former Client, supra note 67; Note,
Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of
Interest, 73 YALE L. J. 1058 (1964).
The same sort of problem exists when government attorneys move into private practice,
but courts have been more liberal when disqualification concerns government attorneys.
Generally, firms that employ attorneys with previous government service have not been dis-
qualified because the courts do not want to discourage attorneys from working for the gov-
ernment. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977). This is allowed
even when the attorney joining the new firm actually has acquired relevant confidential
information during the course of his government service. The major provisos are that the
former government attorney be screened from matters that are within the scope of his for-
mer employment, and that the attorney not share in fees derived from the case. See id.;
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 449 U.S. 1006 (1981); Kramer, supra note 88, at 260-64; see also
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11 (1983); cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1981) ("A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a
matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."). See
generally G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 107-19 (1978); Morgan, Conflicts of
Interest and the Former Client in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 Am. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 993, 996-99; Morgan, supra note 63, at 728-31.
94. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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they will not become effective until the states adopt them.95 The
Model Rules basically codify existing case law with respect to at-
torney disqualifications caused by attorneys moving from one firm
to another. Thus, Model Rule 1.9(a) follows the rule in T.C. &
Theatre Corp.: an attorney cannot represent "another client in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that client's inter-
ests are materially adverse to . . .[a] former client unless the for-
mer client consents after consultation. 96
Model Rule 1.10(b) codifies the rule set forth in Silver Chrysler,
although it eliminates any distiction between an associate and a
partner. 97 Under Model Rule 1.10(b), an attorney's new law firm
cannot represent a client if (1) the attorney formerly represented
another client on a substantially related matter, (2) the former cli-
ent has an interest adverse to that of the client represented by the
new law firm, and (3) the attorney acquired material confidential
information while representing the former client.
In Silver Chrysler the court recognized that associates' ethics
cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.98 The court weighed the interests
of all concerned parties-the associate, the associate's old and new
firms, the clients represented by the old and new firms, and the
public-in formulating a rule regarding attorney disqualification. 99
Taking an approach similar to that of the court in Silver Chrysler,
the ABA in Model Rules 1.9 and 1.10 attempted to reconcile the
competing interests of the former client who wants his secrets and
confidences preserved, the new client who wants to be able to re-
95. Patterson, Legal Ethics, 35 MERCER L. REv. 197, 215 (1983); see supra note 58. There
is considerable doubt whether the Model Rules, at least in their present form, will be
adopted by most states. See Flaherty, Ethics Fight: Round 2-The Model Rules Face Rocky
Road, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Flaherty, Chaos? Breakdown of Ethics Uniform-
ity Seen in Rules Adoption Process, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 10, col. 1. To date, only
New Jersey and Arizona have adopted the Model Rules although many other states are
considering them. Tarr, Do ABA Model Rules Violate Anti-Trust Laws?, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
15, 1984, at 8, col. 1; see Rosen, N. J. Adopts Code Tougher than ABA's, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6,
1984, at 3, col. 1.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1983).
97. Id. Rule 1.10(b).
98. 518 F.2d at 753; accord Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 565 (2d
Cir. 1973).
99. 370 F. Supp. at 583, 589-91, afl'd, 518 F.2d at 756-57; accord Redd v. Shell Oil Co.,
[1974-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,392, at 98,278 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 518
F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975).
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tain counsel of his choice, and the attorney who wants to be able to
join another firm or to go out on his own and obtain clients with-
out being unduly hampered by the rule of disqualification. 10 By
logical extension, in the absence of specific statutes governing par-
ticular ethical problems of associates, the courts should weigh the
interests of the various parties affected by the outcome of the asso-
ciate's decision. 10' Such an approach would aid courts in formulat-
ing a concrete rule.
B. Adler Barish
Another circumstance in which the existence of competing inter-
ests has prompted the use of a balancing test is when the associate
leaves the law firm to practice on his own. The issue of what tac-
tics the associate can use to approach the clients of his former em-
ployer and to attract them to his new law firm was addressed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin,
& Creskoff v. Epstein.0 2 In Adler Barish, the court held that it
was improper for the former associates of Adler Barish to engage
in in-person and telephone solicitation of clients of Adler Barish
and then to mail form letters to the clients. 03 The form letters
could be executed to discharge Adler Barish as counsel, to name
the former associates as new counsel, and to create a contingency
fee arrangement. 04 The court added in dicta that if the associates
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1983).
101. Courts generally have used interest-balancing analyses to determine when attorney
disqualifiction is appropriate. Note, Development in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the
Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1244, 1479 (1981); see also General Mill Supply Co. v.
SCA Services, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 704 (1982) (in de-
termining whether it is appropriate to disqualify an entire law firm from representing a
client when an attorney for the firm testifies for the client, the court must weigh potential
prejudice to the parties, to the profession, and to the judicial process); Estep v. Johnson, 383
F. Supp. 1323 (D. Conn. 1974). In Estep the court held that when a staff member of the
legal assistance association and a member of its board of directors were on opposite sides of
a dispute, the remedy was not necessarily limited to the board member's withdrawal. Id.
The remedy depended on a balancing of the following factors: whether disclosure of infor-
mation had occurred, the impact of the disclosure on the client, and the relationship of
board members to staff members within the legal services agency. Id. at 1325-26.
102. 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 442 U.S. 907
(1979).
103. Id. 393 A.2d at 1175.
104. 482 Pa. at 421, 393 A.2d at 1178.
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had merely mailed out formal business announcements to prospec-
tive clients, this conduct would have been permissible according to
a ruling issued under Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A). 05
The court first determined that the associates' right of free
speech under the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion had not been unconstitutionally curtailed. 06 The court bal-
anced the associates' right of free speech against the interests of
the law firm and of the client and concluded that the associates'
speech constituted "commercial speech."' 0 7 Because it was com-
mercial speech, it was entitled to limited first amendment protec-
tion. l08 Making use of information that was obtained from their
former employer, Adler Barish, by contacting Adler Barish clients
was not "pure speech," but rather was a mixture of speech and
conduct. Therefore, without explicitly saying so, the court em-
ployed a balancing test to resolve the issue. 0 9 The court decided
that the interest of the law firm in protecting its relationship with
its clients, and the interest of the clients in not being pressured to
make an uninformed decision regarding which counsel to employ,
outweighed the former associates' right of free speech, at least in
the form of expression in which the speech was made." 0 As the
court in Adler Barish stated,
105. Id. at 428 n.10, 393 A.2d at 1181 n.10.
106. Id. at 423-28, 393 A.2d at 1179-81.
107. See id. at 423-24, 393 A.2d at 1179.
108. See id. at 425-28, 393 A.2d at 1180; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
455-56 (1978); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976). See generally Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial
Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 437 (1980); Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial
Speech, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 720 (1982).
109. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). When speech is mixed with con-
duct "[t]he importance of the first amendment interest affected is weighed against the gov-
ernment interest involved." Note, Federal Statutory Restrictions on Draft Card Burning
are Not Unconstitutional Abridgments of Free Speech, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 597-98
(1969). See generally Note, supra note 108.
Similarly, in the area of equal protection, a balancing test is often employed. The decision
that a classification is suspect depends on whether the classifiction is one in which discrimi-
nation has traditionally existed. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). If the classification is not suspect, only a legitimate
state interest need be present to uphold the constitutionality of the classification. See, e.g.,
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214; Loving, 388 U.S. 1. This setting, like the free speech area, is one
in which strong interests support both sides.
110. See 482 Pa. at 427-28, 393 A.2d at 1181.
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'[T]o reduce the likelihood of overreaching and the exertion of
undue influence on lay persons; to protect the privacy of indi-
viduals; and to avoid situations where the lawyer's exercise of
judgment on behalf of the client will be clouded by his own pe-
cuniary self-interest,' . . . we must reject appellees' argument
and conclude that, just as in Ohralik, the Constitution permits
regulation of their conduct."'
Therefore, the associates' conduct fell outside the type of truthful
advertising of routine legal services that the United States Su-
preme Court held to be constitutionally protected in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona."2
Although the court in Adler Barish appeared to ground its deci-
sion largely in a first amendment analysis of the form of speech
used by the associate-aggressive in-person and telephone solicita-
tion as opposed to passive third-person mailing of formal business
announcements-a significant basis for the court's decision was the
associates' breach of their duty of loyalty to the law firm. The
court in Adler Barish relied upon the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association"' to sup-
port its position that the associates' conduct amounted to im-
proper arm-twisting.1 4 As pointed out by the dissent in Adler Bar-
ish, however, Ohralik involved in-person solicitation that deprived
persons of an opportunity for reflection before they signed on the
dotted line," 5 whereas Adler Barish did not involve such tactics.
The dissent in Adler Barish cogently pointed out that the mail-
ing of the form letters in Adler Barish was not nearly as coercive
as the in-person solicitation that the Supreme Court condemned in
Ohralik. .'6 Therefore, the court's constitutional decision in Adler
Barish would appear to rest in part on the associates' violation of
their duty not to compete with their former employer by using cli-
ent information that they acquired while working at their former
111. Id. at 428, 393 A.2d at 1181; see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461
(1978).
112. Id. at 424, 393 A.2d at 1179 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977)).
113. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
114. 482 Pa. at 420, 393 A.2d at 1181.
115. Id. at 440-41, 393 A.2d at 1187-88 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
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law firm."' Moreover, if the decision in Adler Barish is based on
the impropriety of mailing the letters rather than on the impropri-
ety of the associates' breaching their fiduciary duty to the firm, the
decision arguably conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's
later decision in In re R.M.J."5s In re R.M.J. concerned certain re-
strictions on attorneys' solicitation of clients by mail that were
held unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth
amendments."'
The court in Adler Barish also determined whether the law firm
had a right of action against the associates. Again, the court im-
plicitly balanced the legitimate interests advanced by the associ-
ates' conduct against the interests disturbed by that conduct.120
The interests advanced by the associates' conduct included the as-
sociates' pecuniary self-interest and the clients' interest in having a
greater range of counsel from which to choose. The associates' con-
duct conflicted with the law firm's interest in protecting its busi-
ness secrets and in preserving contractual relationships with its cli-
ents. In particular, the associates unfairly competed with Adler
Barish by improperly taking advantage of the confidential attor-
ney-client relationship created during the course of their prior em-
ployment.'2 ' The associates' "contacts were made possible because
117. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (former CIA agent who violated
agreement not to divulge classified information without prepublication clearance breached
fiduciary obligation when he published a book about CIA and, notwithstanding first amend-
ment claim, proceeds from sale of the book placed in constructive trust for government);
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir.
1979) ("The First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in
intellectual property."); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-207 (1982) ("[Tjhe states
retain the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proved
to be misleading in practice. There may be other substantial state interests as well that will
support carefully drawn restrictions.").
118. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). In In re R.M.J., the Supreme Court held unconstitutional under
the first and fourteenth amendments a Missouri Supreme Court rule under which an attor-
ney was reprimanded for unprofessional conduct for having mailed out business cards to
persons other than those permitted under the rule. Id. The Supreme Court also held that
the attorney was unconstitutionally reprimanded for having published announcements that
listed areas of his practice other than those specified in the rule, and for having listed juris-
dictions in which the attorney was licensed to practice in violation of the rule. Id.
119. Id.
120. 482 Pa. at 431-33, 393 A.2d at 1183.
121. Id. at 435-36, 393 A.2d at 1185; accord Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Scheck, 485 F. Supp. 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554,
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Adler Barish partners trusted . . . [the associates] with the high
responsibility of developing its clients' cases. From this position of
trust and responsibility, . . . [the associates] were able to gain
knowledge of the details, and status, of each case to which . . .
[they] had been assigned."' 22
The associates' conduct also conflicted with the clients' interest
in not being confused by the high pressure tactics of the former
associates. The court framed the test for a cause of action in terms
of the propriety of the associates' interference with the contractual
relations of the law firm:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally in-
terfering with an existing contract or a prospective contractual
relation of another is improper or not, consideration is given to
the following factors:
(a) The nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) The actor's motive,
(c) The interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) The interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) The proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(f) The relations between the parties.123
In sum, Adler Barish involved a conflict of interests between the
law firm partnership and some of its former associates. The public
and the clients of Adler Barish were interested in information
about and access to reasonably priced legal counsel. Because these
same interests generally are present when associates encounter
ethical problems, the use of a balancing test is helpful in evaluat-
ing the scope of an associate's ethical obligations. The following are
the interests that must be balanced: the associate's economic inter-
est, the law firm's economic interest, the associate's fiduciary obli-
gation to the law firm and the extent to which the questioned con-
duct adversely affects that duty, the interest of the client in
558, 147 N.E.2d 724, 726, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (1958); see also 2 Callman, Unfair Competi-
tion, Trademarks and Monopolies § 14.31 (4th ed. 1983).
122. 482 Pa. at 435-36, 393 A.2d at 1185.
123. Id. at 433, 393 A.2d at 1184 (footnote omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 767 (1979)).
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securing effective and reasonably priced legal services, the eco-
nomic interest of the legal community in wishing to be perceived in
the best possible light, and the interest of the public. In general,
the interests of the client and the public should take precedence
over the economic interests of the associate or the law firm.
It is important to consider not only the test that should be em-
ployed in evaluating the propriety of the conduct of the associate
or the partner, but also who should be the decisionmaker to apply
the test. In short, neither the associate nor the partner always is
the appropriate person to make the initial ethical judgment. In
those situations in which the activity undertaken by the associate
is motivated by the associate's own pecuniary interests, he tends to
lose objectivity in evaluating the propriety of the conduct. Simi-
larly, when the law firm partner has a greater financial stake in the
outcome of an issue than does the associate, he is less likely to be
able to appraise objectively whether a certain action is ethical. Cir-
cumstances in which the associate's actions are motivated by his
own pecuniary interests are discussed in Part IV A and Part IV B
below. Circumstances in which the partner's actions are motivated
largely by his own pecuniary interests are discussed in Part IV C
below.
IV. COMMON ETHICAL PROBLEMS
A. The Purchase of Client Securities
One frequent problem faced by law firm associates is whether to
purchase shares of stock of a corporate client.'24 The first step that
the associate who is considering purchasing client securities should
take is to ascertain whether the firm has a policy covering the
purchase of client securities. 2 5 If the law firm has a policy that
124. A survey was sent to law firm associates in Illinois. See Appendix. Only 12% of the
law firm associates surveyed had invested in the securities of a client of their law firm.
However, 36% of the associates had purchased securities while working for their firm. Sur-
vey Response to Question #13, Appendix. Of those who purchased securities, 63% failed to
investigate the possibility that the firm had any confidential information about the company
whose stock was purchased. Survey Responses to Question #14, Appendix. This figure over-
states any possible ethical problem because most of the associates work for small law firms
in which the associate would know that his investment in, for example, General Motors
would cause no problem.
125. Eighty-five percent of the associates surveyed in Illinois, see Appendix, responded
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entirely prohibits the purchase of securities,12 or places restric-
tions on such purchases, the associate's duty of obedience requires
him to adhere to that policy.12 7
If there is no policy prohibiting the purchase of client securities,
an associate who wants to purchase client securities must make
sure that such a purchase does not violate the federal securities
laws. In particular, the associate must not make use of material
inside information in making the purchase. 2 ' Even if the associate
becomes privy to such information inadvertently, his fiduciary
duty to the client creates both a duty not to disclose'29 that infor-
that their law firm did not have a policy on investment in client securities by associates.
Survey Responses to Question #10, Appendix. Formal policies are much more prevalent
among the large firms. Of those firms with 40 or more attorneys whose associates answered
the question (6% of the respondents), 40% had a policy regarding investments in client
securities.
Of all of the firms that were surveyed that had an investment policy, 25% permitted
investments, 37.5% forbade investments, and 37.5% restricted investments in some fashion.
Survey Responses to Question #11, Appendix.
126. A policy prohibiting the purchase of all client securities, subject to a few exceptions,
has existed at the New York law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore since the early part of
the twentieth century. R. SWAINE, 2 THE CRAvATH FIRM 9-10 (1948).
127. Law firms are required to maintain procedures that ensure compliance with the stan-
dards of professional responsibility. E.g., Spindell v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 253, 530 P.2d 168,
118 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1975); In re Palmieri, 75 N.J. 488, 383 A.2d 1142 (1978); In re Rude, 88
S.D. 416, 221 N.W.2d 43 (1974). The required procedures can vary with the size of the firm.
Less formal procedures and supervision are required in small firms than are required in
large ones. Furthermore, some firms have a procedure enabling associates to refer difficult
ethical problems to a disinterested senior partner or a special committee. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 5.1 comment (1983).
128. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); SEC Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
If the associate's law firm is acting as counsel for an issuer, underwriter, or selling security
holder, and is named in a prospectus of the client corporation "as having passed upon legal
matters in connection with the registration, or offering of securities," the firm must disclose
any financial interest that the firm, a partner, or a partcipating attorney has in "the issuer
or offering". SEC Release No. 5094 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 77,917 (October 21, 1970). Disclosure is not required if the aggregate amount of the inter-
est owned, received, or to be recieved by the firm or by all of the attorney's employed by the
firm does not exceed $30,000, and if no more than $10,000 is held by any one of such indi-
viduals. Id. Therefore, an associate purchasing the securities of a client that is registering or
offering securities must be sure that his ownership interest is reported, as required by SEC
Release No. 5094. Id.
129. A typical situation arises when an associate learns through firm gossip that a client is
planning to acquire another company. The associate should presume that the information
was transmitted to the law firm by the client through a confidential communication, al-
though the associate is free to verify this with the partner in charge of the matter. When the
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mation and a duty to abstain from trading in the securities.'
Assuming that there is no firm policy against purchasing client
securities, and assuming that the associate has not acquired mate-
rial inside information, a question still remains whether the associ-
ate is free to purchase client securities. Although there is no spe-
cific disciplinary rule or ethical consideration governing purchases
source of the information is the client's confidential communication, section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 prohibit the associate from purchasing shares in
either the client's company or the target company. See generally Illegal Inside Trading
Seems to be on Rise; Ethical Issues Muddled, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
In September 1981, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a New York law firm specializing in
tender offers, demanded the resignation of a partner, Carlo M. Florentino, after he had
admitted trading in the stocks of several of the firm's clients. Florentino was charged with
illegally using inside information to buy stock. N.Y. Times, Sep. 12, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
In 1982, the SEC sued Kenneth Rubinstein, an attorney with Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver, & Jacobson in New York City, for trading on inside information that he acquired
concerning the takeover of Texasgulf by ELF Acquitaine. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at
D24, col. 5. Rubinstein gave up his profits of $196,000 and was enjoined from future viola-
tions of the securities law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1982, § 4, at 15, col. 1.
130. See Dirks v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980). Ethical Consideration 4-5 stat s that a lawyer
should not use information obtained during the course of his employment for his own pur-
poses, except after full disclosure to the client and consent by the client. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1981); see also Securities Exchange Comm'n v. Ler-
ner, Litigation Release No. 9049 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
V 97,334 (April 2, 1980). In Lerner, the SEC brought a complaint against both partners and
associates of a New Jersey patent law firm and their tippees alleging that these individuals
purchased securities of a corporate client while the attorneys were in a position to receive
material nonpublic information concerning developments in a patent application for a laser.
Id. The SEC charged a violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. The
defendants settled, agreeing to give up their profits. Id. The law firm was ordered to imple-
ment procedures to prevent the use or dissemination by any of its members or employees of
material nonpublic information obtained during the course of their employment. Id.
In the Lerner opinion, the SEC explained its policy concerning the abuse of inside infor-
mation by partners, associates, and employees of law firms:
Law firms, like others which have confidential information in their possession
that may affect the securities trading markets, have an affirmative obligation
to safeguard such information. While . . . no procedures can guarantee that
individual employees will not take unfair advantage of their position, law firms
are encouraged to establish policies and procedures regarding confidential in-
formation and take steps to ensure that all firm personnel are familiar with
those policies, including the serious consequences that may result from con-
duct violating such plicies.
SEC Release No. 13437 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 8,116 (April
8, 1977). Ethical Consideration 4-5 imposes a similar duty on law firms to prevent the mis-
use of information by associates and employees. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY EC 4-5 (1981).
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of client securities, certain provisions of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility implicitly restrict an associate's purchase of
client securities. According to Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A), an attor-
ney must refuse to accept employment when his professional judg-
ment might be swayed by his personal interests, including his
financial interests. 131 Yet Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) does not di-
rectly address the scope of an associate's permissible activity after
the client has hired the law firm. Most courts have interpreted Dis-
ciplinary Rule 5-101(A) as requiring that the attorney attempt to
minimize any conflict between his own interests and those of his
client by avoiding the acquisition of financial interests that might
affect his judgment concerning his client's interests.'32
To the extent that an associate might be able to influence the
price of a company's stock by his actions, there might be a conflict
between his personal interests and his duty to the client. This
problem is most likely to arise when the associate purchases stock
in a small, closely held corporation. 133 Similarly, if the associate
were to adopt a "short" position in the stock, hoping for the stock
to decline in value so that he could profit by purchasing it at a
lower price, the personal interest of the associate is more likely to
conflict with the interest of the client. For this reason, some law
firms restrict purchases of stock by associates to large, publicly
traded companies and forbid the acquisition of "short" positions in
client stock.'34
Canon Nine and Disciplinary Rule 9-101 require that an associ-
ate avoid the appearance of impropriety. Moreover, the associate's
duty of loyalty to the firm requires that he avoid subjecting the
131. Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment
on behalf of a client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business,
property, or personal interests." Model Code of Professional Responsbility DR 5-101(A)
(1981).
132. See Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3rd Cir.
1977); Alexander v. Russo, 1 Kan. App. 2d 546, 571 P.2d 350 (1977); In re Loring, 62 N.J.
336, 301 A.2d 721 (1973).
133. R. MUNDHEIM & A. FLEISCHER, SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
243-45 (6th ed. 1975). Of those associates surveyed who purchased client securities, three
out of five, or 60% purchased the securities of a client whose stock traded on other than a
national securities exchange. Survey Responses to Question #16, Appendix.
134. One law firm in the Illinois survey limited purchases of securities to clients who are
"reputable." Survey Responses to Question #12, Appendix.
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firm to the appearance of impropriety. 135 If the firm has confiden-
tial information about the corporate client, the associate's
purchase of its stock might reflect badly on the firm. In particular,
the firm might be viewed as having violated the securities laws or
Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A). Even though the associate might de-
cide that his purchase will not appear improper, the law firm will
be in a better position than the associate to judge the potential
impact of such a purchase on the firm's reputation in the commu-
nity. Therefore, the law firm should decide whether the associate
may purchase client securities. In all cases, prior to his purchase of
corporate securities, an associate should check the client files of his
firm to ascertain whether the company whose stock he wants to
purchase is a client of the firm. 13 6 If the company is a client of the
firm, the associate's duty of loyalty and his duty to avoid the ap-
pearance of impropriety require that he obtain partnership ap-
proval of his purchases of client securities.
Under the Model Rules, an attorney's duty to avoid the acquisi-
tion of a financial interest that might conflict with his representa-
tion of the client's interests is more explicit. Model Rule 1.7(b)
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the repre-
sentation of that client may be materially limited by the ... law-
yer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client
consents after consultation."'137 The comment to Model Rule 1.7
states that a "lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to
have adverse effect on representation of a client."'"" The Rule also
states that "[a] lawyer may not allow related business interests to
affect representation."'3 s The Model Rules and comments thus try
to accommodate the competing interests of the attorney, the client,
the law firm, and the public. The Rules make the client's interest
paramount. The client retains a veto power over attorney invest-
135. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 & DR 9-101 (1981).
136. For a discussion of law firm index systems and how they can be used to prevent
conflicts of interest and other potential ethical problems, see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 20, § 13.
137. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
138. Id. comment.
139. Id. Rule 1.7; see also Model Rule 8.4(C) (conduct involving dishonesty or fraud is
professional misconduct).
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ments in circumstances where the attorney initially determines
that his financial interests limit his ability to represent the client.
The language of Model Rule 1.7 is broad enough to cover a variety
of financial interests. Unfortunately, the Model Rules do not enu-
merate the specific investment situations in which it should be pre-
sumed that the attorney's interest materially limits his representa-
tion of the client. If such a presumption existed, the attorney's
investment in client securities while the attorney continued to re-
present the client would be proper only if both of the conditions in
Model Rule 1.7(b) had been met.
In addition, Model Rule 1.7 does not give sufficient weight to the
interests of the public and the legal profession in avoiding the ap-
pearance of impropriety. Attorneys who trade in client securities,
particularly closely held corporate stock, might be perceived as
acting improperly even when they are not doing so.140 The Model
Rules do not contain Canon Nine's somewhat amorphous appear-
ance of impropriety test. 41 However, by rejecting the admittedly
imperfect standard of Canon Nine, the Model Rules have upset the
delicate balance of competing interests. The Model Rules give
somewhat greater weight to the financial interest of the attorney at
the expense of the interests of the legal profession and the public.
B. Moonlighting by Law Firm Associates
Moonlighting is the practice of simultaneously holding two or
more jobs with more than one employer. 42 As the term is used in
this Article, moonlighting by law firm associates refers to the prac-
tice of law by an associate for someone other than his regular em-
ployer. With the exception of doing work for family and friends,
generally without pay, the vast majority of associates do not moon-
140. At least before it adopted the Model Rules, New Jersey adhered to the doctrine that
a lawyer had a conflict of interest if his conduct might be perceived as being improper. See
SEC Objects to Proposal on Former Government Lawyers [Current Reports vol. 1, no 1]
LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) at 18-19 (January 25, 1984). Ap-
parently, New Jersey was willing to relax the "appearance of impropriety" standard when
an attorney moved from one firm to another and the attorney's former client waived the
imputed disqualification of the new firm. However, lawyers moving from government service
to private law firms were subject to strict disqualification rules based on the appearance-of-
impropriety test.
141. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.8, 4.1 (1983).
142. See HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (CCH) 1 2406 (June 1983).
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light.143 Of those firms that have moonlighting policies, some com-
pletely forbid moonlighting, whereas others only restrict the prac-
tice in some fashion.14  These restrictions include, among others:
that the work be done only for family or friends, that the work be
done without charge, and that the work not consume an inordinate
amount of the associate's time. 45 This section, first, will examine
the propriety of law firm policies that restrict or prohibit moon-
lighting and, second, will discuss the appropriateness of moonlight-
ing when there is no law firm policy on the subject.
There are four major reasons why some law firms have anti-
moonlighting policies. Probably the most important reason is to
prevent an associate from taking on outside work that would im-
pair the efficiency of his work for the firm.1 46 The associate's effi-
ciency could be impaired if he has less time available to spend on
work for the firm.' 47 Moreover, the associate might spend part of
his normal working hours doing work that he began while moon-
lighting. In addition, the associate's outside work might make him
143. See Glaberson, The Case of a "'Firm Within a Firm," N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1982, at 1,
col. 2. Although 41% of the associates responding to the Illinois survey stated that they had
moonlighted at some time, 68% of the associates who moonlighted received no pay for the
work, and 89%,, of the associates who moonlighted only worked for their family and friends.
Survey Responses to Questions #6-9, Appendix.
144. Fifty-three percent of the law firms whose associates responded to the Illinois survey
had policies on moonlighting. Survey Responses to Question #3, Appendix. Of those law
firms with moonlighting policies, 65% of the firms prohibited moonlighting, 7% permitted
moonlighting, and 28% restricted it. Survey Responses to Question #4, Appendix.
145 Survey Responses to Question #5, Appendix.
146. Cf. Baity v. Civil Service Comm'n of Los Angeles County, 103 Cal. App. 3d 155, 162
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1980). In Baity, a county ordinance prohibited full time employees from
performing more than twenty-four hours of outside work per week. Id. The purpose of the
ordinance was to prevent the employment of persons in full time county positions whose
efficiency would be impaired by outside work. Id.
147. In October 1982, three associates at the New York law firm of Haight, Gardner, Poor
& Havens "resigned" after the firm confronted them with evidence that showed that the
associates had formed a firm of their own to moonlight. The associates acknowledged that
they had printed stationery and business cards with their names as a firm on them and had
"handled some legal work 'on the side.'" When questioned about the resignations, a partner
stated that, "when he hired an associate, an implied term of the relationship is that the
associate will devote full time to the practice of law on behalf of the firm and its clients."
Glaberson, The Case of a "Firm Within a Firm," N.Y.L.J., Oct 25, 1982, at 1, col. 2; cf.
Stewart, Extracurricular Work by Law Professors is Source of Controversy, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (moonlighting by law school professors raises many of the same
problems that moonlighting by law firm associates raises).
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too tired to perform at his normal level. 148
A second reason for antimoonlighting policies is the concern that
the associate will attempt to compete with the law firm and will
take away business that might otherwise flow to the firm. 49 Appar-
ently for this reason, some firms have adopted policies that permit
moonlighting only if it is done without charge. 150 A third reason for
antimoonlighting policies is to prevent associates from using firm
resources to work on moonlighting matters.'5 ' For example, associ-
ates might use resources such as the firm's secretaries, photocopy-
ing machines, telephones, and messengers to work on nonfirm
jobs.15 2
A fourth reason for antimoonlighting policies is to prevent con-
flicts of interest. 53 When an associate represents a client indepen-
dently, knowledge gleaned by the associate from the client might
148. See HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (CCH) 1 2406 (June 1983); see also Flood v.
Kennedy, 12 N.Y.2d 345, 346, 348, 190 N.E.2d 13, 14, 15, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 665, 667 (1963).
149. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (CCH) 1 2406 (June 1983). Of course, even in the
absence of a moonlighting policy, an associate has a fiduciary duty not to compete with the
law firm. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text. If the associate breaches that duty,
the firm can discharge him without subjecting itself to liability, even if the associate is em-
ployed for a term. See Brown v. DuPuy, 4 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1924); Perfection Mattress &
Spring Co. v. Dupree, 216 Ala. 303, 113 So. 74 (1927); Dawson v. Clark, 145 Col. 278, 358
P.2d 591 (1961).
150. Survey Responses to Question #5, Appendix. Law firms also are motivated by their
ethical responsibility to allow their associates to do volunteer work without charge. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUcT Rule 6.1 (1983); see Implementing the Lawyers Public Interest Practice Litigation, 63
A.B.A.J. 678 (1977) (ABA House of Delegates Resolution stating that all lawyers have a
responsibility to do some public service work, either for no fee or at a reduced fee);
Margolick, Big Law Firms in New York Stepping Up Volunteer Work, New York Times,
May 2, 1984, at 1, col. 5. In 1980, the memberships of the Bar Association of the City of New
York and the New York State Bar Association overwhelmingly rejected a proposed change
in the Code of Professional Responsibility Act that would have required 30-50 hours of pub-
lic service activities per annum for all attorneys. Id.; A 'Palatable' Form of Public Service,
New York Times, Jan. 4, 1981, § 4, at 5, col. 5; New York Bar Group Rejects Overhaul of
Ethics Code, New York Times, Nov. 2, 1980, at 45, col. 4; see also Gerson, Idealistic Law-
yers, Corporation Bound, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1984, at 25, col. 1.
151. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (CCH) 1 2406 (June 1983).
152. See Brill, Willkie Farr's Cover-Up, The American Lawyer, Aug. 5, 1981, at 4, col. 1.
153. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (1981). Even in the ab-
sence of antimoonlighting policies, an associate's duty of loyalty should prevent him from
entering into another relationship that is inconsistent with his relationship with the law
firm. See generally 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1013, 1014C
(3d ed. 1967).
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be imputed to the associate's firm.' Consequently, the entire firm
could be barred from representing another client, even if the firm
did not permit the associate to work on the matter. 155
There is no provision of the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility specifically addressing the issue of moonlighting by associ-
ates. The principal argument against antimoonlighting policies
springs from Canon Two of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which calls for lawyers to assist the legal profession
in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available.5 5 Arguably, an
agreement restricting or prohibiting moonlighting prevents some
people from obtaining counsel.
Given the great number of lawyers currently practicing,'57 pay-
ing clients should not have to rely on moonlighting counsel to se-
cure effective representation. Furthermore, even if some clients
would prefer to hire a moonlighting attorney because such an at-
torney might charge a lower fee, the interests of the moonlighting
attorney's firm and the clients whom the associate represents dur-
154. See W. SEAVEY, supra note 14, § 97A.
155. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983). See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying
text. This situation is similar to the situation in which the associate leaves one firm to work
for another, and the associate's prior affiliation results in his new firm's disqualification be-
cause his prior work was substantially related to the current representation. Moreover, the
ongoing receipt of information by the moonlighting associate creates an even greater appear-
ance of impropriety. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir.
1976).
156. Despite the broad language of Canon Two, there is no disciplinary rule or ethical
consideration that prevents a law firm from restricting or prohibiting moonlighting. Discipli-
nary Rule 2-108 prohibits an employment agreement "with another lawyer that restricts the
right of the lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the
agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1981). Because it does not mention employment
agreements that restrict the attorney's right to practice law during the employment relation-
ship, Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) implicitly appears to permit antimoonlighting policies.
157. The American Bar Association estimates that as of February 1984, there were
627,787 attorneys in the United States. Telephone interviews with Art Miller, Librarian
with the American Bar Foundation (April 30, 1984); see also Bok, A Flawed System of Law
Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 570, 570-72 (1983); Fowler, Lawyers in Pursuit of
Jobs, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1983, at D27, col. 1. But see Galante, Too Many Lawyers? Con-
ference Yields Critics of Bok's Claims, 6 Pa. L. J. Rep., Dec. 12, 1983, at 6, col. 1. In con-
trast, Japan, with about one-half the population of the United States, has about one-fiftieth
the number of attorneys. Taylor, On the Evidence, Americans Would Rather Sue than Set-
tle, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1981, § 4, at 8, col. 1.
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ing normal working hours should outweigh the interest of the cli-
ent who chooses to search for a bargain.
On the other hand, if an associate's moonlighting work consists
only of work without a fee, the relative interest of the employer
who prevents moonlighting becomes less obvious. If an associate is
providing his service for a client who cannot obtain counsel, and if
the associate is working without a fee, the associate is following the
suggestion of Ethical Considerations 8-3 and 2-25 to provide legal
services to those unable to pay for them.158 Moreover, the potential
for competition between the associate and the law firm does not
exist because the law firm cannot profit from people unable to pay
for legal services. Thus, a law firm's antimoonlighting policy that
restricts rather than prohibits moonlighting is more consistent
with the bar's interest in encouraging associates to handle matters
pro bono publico. For example, a law firm could permit an associ-
ate to handle family matters without charge or public interest mat-
ters on a pro bono basis, provided that such representation did not
consume an inordinate amount of time and did not interfere with
the associate's normal duties.'59 Of course, the law firm could
adopt instead a policy that permits associates to use firm time to
handle pro bono matters that have been approved by a partner.
The law firm would then be able to fulfill its "responsibility" under
Ethical Considerations 8-3 and 2-25, and at the same time, pro-
hibit moonlighting.
Another advantage of restricting rather than prohibiting moon-
lighting is that enforcement of a restrictive policy is more cost-ef-
158. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-3, 2-25 (1981); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983); Feirich, Mandatory Pro Bono Haunts our
Future, 71 ILL. B.J. 274 (1983); Ehrlich, Rationing Justice, 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 729
(1979). An attorney working on a nonprofit basis is viewed differently from one working on a
matter in which a fee is expected. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, decided
in conjunction with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the court
distinguished its holding in Ohralik by stating:
Unlike the situation in Ohralik, however, appellant's act of solicitation took
the form of a letter to a woman with whom appellant had discussed the possi-
bility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization. This was
not in person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an
offer of free assistance by attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an offer
predicated on entitlement to a share of any monetary recovery.
436 U.S. at 422.
159. See Survey Responses to Question #5, Appendix.
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fective. The costs incurred in policing a policy that prohibits all
moonlighting might very well exceed the value of the associate's
disputed time to the law firm.' 6° Thus, in order to prevent all
moonlighting, a partner might have to spend a considerable por-
tion of his time monitoring associates when he could spend his
time more productively by working on matters for clients.
As a contractual matter, a law firm should be able to enforce an
antimoonlighting policy as it would enforce any other condition of
employment.' 6 ' An associate who enters into a contract with a law
firm that has a restrictive moonlighting policy is not in a particu-
larly good position to complain about the fairness of that policy,
unless that policy conflicts with the bar association's ethical
constraints." 2
A law firm's contractual right to restrict or prohibit moonlight-
ing is economically efficient. If a law firm has an antimoonlighting
policy, it probably bargains for such a policy with each associate
that it hires. More specifically, the firm pays the associate more
money so that the associate does not work elsewhere. The law firm
makes the decision to pay more because it believes that the extra
hours that the associate works for the firm compensate the firm for
the premium that it pays the associate. The associate must decide
that he profits more if he works for the employer that restricts
moonlighting than if he moonlights while working for an employer
that permits moonlighting. The restrictive law firm presumably
charges its clients more for the associate's work than the sum of
160. See W. KLEIN, supra note 5, at 26.
161. Cf. In re Capps, 250 Ga. 242, 243, 297 S.E.2d 249, 250 (1982). In Capps an attorney
was employed on a full time basis for Brown Transport Corporation, which had a policy
prohibiting the attorney from engaging in private practice. Id. While employed by Brown,
the attorney incorporated and applied for authority from the ICC to operate a trucking
company in competition with his employer. Id. The attorney was disciplined by the Georgia
State Bar not for violating company policy but rather for violating the State Bar's rules
against an attorney acting adversely toward a client's interest. Id.
162. Even if the antimoonlighting policy became known to the associate only through
reading the law firm's associate manual, the policy could be contractually enforceable. Cf.
Weiner v. McGraw Hill, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 458 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). In Weiner
the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant employer could not terminate the
employee at will, even though the employee had not been hired for a fixed term. Id. Defen-
dant's application for employment incorporated by reference the company's handbook on
personnel policies. Id. These policies, which precluded dismissal absent a showing of just
and sufficient cause, were found to be part of the contract. Id.
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the charges of the firm that permits moonlighting and the associate
who moonlights.
Conversely, if uniform ethical standards prevent an associate
from moonlighting and his firm does not have a moonlighting pol-
icy, economic efficiency decreases. 163 This decrease occurs because
the associate cannot moonlight even when the law firm is not able
to maximize its use of his time. Because efficiency decreases,
moonlighting should be treated as a contractual problem rather
than subjected to a uniform ethical standard.
C. A Partner's Unethical Instructions to An Associate
An associate is confronted with an unpleasant problem when a
partner gives him instructions that the associate believes are un-
ethical. Under the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the associate receives little guidance except for the warning
that he may be disciplined for violations of the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.' Even if he fears the loss of his job, an
associate must comply with the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.6 5 Disobeying the instructions of a partner raises dif-
ferent problems.
An associate who disobeys the unethical instructions of a partner
is not liable to the partner or to the law firm for any damages that
result from his disobedience. 6 6 However, an associate who diso-
beys instructions that he believes are unethical risks discharge. In
many states, no cause of action is available to an employee who is
terminable at will and is discharged for an improper reason. 6 7 Fur-
163. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 5 (1978); A. Po-
LINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-28 (1983); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW PART II (2d ed. 1977).
164. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1981).
165. Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 431 A.2d 1336 (1981); In re Mogel,
18 A.D.2d 203, 238 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1963); In re Knight, 129 Vt. 428, 281 A.2d 46 (1971); see
In re Lemisch, 321 Pa. 110, 184 A. 72 (1936); In re Goldberg, 321 Pa. 109, 184 A. 74 (1936).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 411 & comment (d) (1958).
167. There is a split of authority on whether the discharge of an "at-will" employee as a
reprisal for opposition to the employer's unethical or illegal conduct is actionable. In Mur-
phy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1983), an accountant employed by the defendant corporation contended that his discharge
was wrongful because it constituted retaliation for his whistle blowing on alleged improprie-
ties of corporate personnel. Id. The New York Court of Appeals held that the cause of
action properly had been dismissed because there is no statutory or common law cause of
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thermore, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not
appear to make unethical the discharge of an associate who refuses
to follow unethical instructions. 6 '
The new Model Rules do not specifically prohibit a partner from
discharging an associate who does not comply with unethical in-
structions. However, Model Rule 5.1(b) requires that a supervising
lawyer make reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of the
action in tort for abusive or wrongful discharge of an "at-will" employee in New York. Id. In
contrast, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
of an at-will employee who worked as a quality control manager and who alleged that his
employer dismissed him in retaliation for his insistence that the employer comply with the
requirements of the Connecticut version of the Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmestic Act. Id.
The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action because the plaintiff's position as
quality control director might have exposed him to the possibility of prosecution under the
Act. Similarly, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980), an employee who was discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal
scheme to fix prices was held to have a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge. See
generally Holloway, Fired Employees Challenging Terminable At-Will Doctrine, 1 Nat'l
L.J. 23 (1979); Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980); Note, Protecting the Pri-
vate Sector Employee who "Blows the Whistle'" A Cause of Action Based upon Determi-
nation of Public Policy, 1977 Wisc. L. Rev. 777; Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4TH 544, § 15 (1982);
Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4TH 329 (1981).
Even in those states that do not permit a cause of action in tort for abusive discharge, a
law firm manual that states or implies that an associate will not be dismissed without good
cause could give an associate a cause of action for breach of contract. Cf. Paugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc.,
648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw Hill, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d
441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); D. EWING, Do IT MY WAY OR YOU'RE FIRED 103-04 (1983);
Eisler, Contracts, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 719, 739-43 (1982); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4TH 544 (1982).
168. This author found no cases in which a law firm partner was disciplined by a bar
association for dismissing an associate arbitrarily. But see Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion, Formal Op. 391 (1981) (an associate who refuses to approve fraudulent billing cannot
be discharged for that reason because such conduct makes the participation in fraudulent
conduct a condition of the associate's continued employment) cited in, LAWYERS' MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 801:1704 (1984).
There is a split in scholarly opinion as to the wisdom of giving law firm associates tenure
in order to foster ethical conduct. Compare Confer, Professional Tenure as a Means to
Promote Ethical Compliance in the Civil Discovery Process, 59 NEB. L. REv. 35 (1980) and
Kalish, The Attorney's Role in the Private Organization, 59 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1980) (pro-
tenure for associates) with Schaefer, Professional Tenure: Is It Really a Solution? 59 NEB.
L. REv. 28 (1980) and Schneyer, Limited Tenure for Lawyers and the Structure of Lawyer-
Client Relations: A Critique of the Lawyer's Proposed Right to Sue for Wrongful Dis-
charge, 59 NEB. L. REv. 11 (1980) (critical of the tenure proposal).
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supervised lawyer conforms with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 169 Model Rule 5.2(a) provides that an associate is bound
by the Rules of Professional Conduct even though he acted at the
direction of another lawyer. 70 Model Rule 8.4 states that it is pro-
fessional misconduct knowingly to assist or induce another to vio-
late or to attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 7'
Professor Levinson has construed these provisions to mean that it
is unethical for a partner to discharge a law firm associate who ref-
uses to follow unethical instructions.172
The main problem for the associate is to determine whether he
must behave unethically in order to execute his instructions.
Model Rule 5.2(b) attempts to remove some of the pressure on the
associate who must make such a determination by providing that
"a subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory law-
yer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional
duty."273
Model Rule 5.2(b) is troublesome for several reasons. First, the
Rule makes it much easier for an associate to follow the questiona-
ble instructions of a partner. Failure to follow the instructions
would violate the associate's duty of obedience to the partner." 4
Therefore, absent some defense to the violation of the duty of obe-
dience, the partner would be justified if he dismissed the associate.
Unless the rules of professional responsibility impose disciplinary
169. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(b) (1983).
170. Id. Rule 5.2(a).
171. Id. Rule 8.4.
172. See supra note 38.
173. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2(b) (1983). The comment to Model
Rule 5.2 makes it clear that an associate is not relieved of ethical responsibility merely
because he follows the instructions of a law firm partner. Even if an associate violated a rule
of ethical conduct because he feared that he would lose his job, the associate would be liable
for the misconduct, although the court could consider that fact in mitigation of the penalty
imposed. The comment to the May 30, 1981, draft of Model Rule 5.2, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2(b) comment (1983), cited the following cases in support of
this proposition: In re Mogel, 18 A.D.2d 203, 238 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1963); In re Knight, 129 Vt.
428, 281 A.2d 46 (1971); see In re Lemisch, 321 Pa. 110, 184 A. 72 (1936); In re Goldberg,
321 Pa. 109, 184 A. 74 (1936); see also In re Kiley, 22 A.D. 2d 527, 256 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1965).
As pointed out in the comment, all these cases involved situations in which the associate
was involved in clearly wrongful conduct. The comment added that there is no case author-
ity to support Model Rule 5.2(b).
174. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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sanctions for failure to report the questionble conduct of the part-
ner, in some states the associate's ability to report such conduct
and still maintain a civil action for abusive or wrongful discharge is
reduced. 175 Model Rule 5.2(b) leaves the conscientious associate in
a real quandary. 176 Furthermore, because an associate might be less
likely to report questionable ethical practices, Model Rule 5.2(b)
might have the effect of further lowering the public's unfavorable
opinion of the legal profession. 77 The Rule might also have a det-
rimental impact on attorneys' self-perception. 71
Finally, Model Rule 5.2(b) fails to account for those particular
situations in which as associate is as well equipped as a partner to
make ethical decisions. In such cases, deference by the associate to
the questionable ethical decisions of a partner is unwarranted. For
example, a partner might tell an associate who is skilled in discov-
ery practice to withhold documents on the ground that the docu-
175. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). See
supra note 167 and accompanying text.
176. As Professor Levinson has noted, Model Rule 5.2(b) is troublesome because it in-
troduces the defense of superior orders, which has been asserted by the defendants in vari-
ous contexts from Nuremberg to My Lai to Watergate-with disastrous results. Levinson,
supra note 38, at 852 n.13. See generally United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 730-31
(7th Cir. 1953) (obedience to the orders of a superior does not necessarily negate the specific
intent requirement set forth in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)); United States
v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 34-35 (D.D.C. 1974) (conviction of John Ehrlichman, Presi-
dent Nixon's National Security Advisor, for his role in the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's office), af'd, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977);
H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1964); T. TAYLOR,
NUREMBURG AND VIET NAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1970).
177. See Burger, The Role of the Law Schools in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (1980) (noting that in a 1977 Gallup Poll,
the honesty and ethical standards of lawyers were rated lower than members of the clergy,
medical doctors, engineers, college teachers, bankers, police, journalists, undertakers, busi-
ness executives, and building contractors); Frazer, A Few Myths About the Legal Profes-
sion, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 25; Podgers, The Lawyer's Image-A Problem That
Won't Go Away, B. Leader, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 11. An ABA poll found that 68% of the
public believed that attorneys charged more than their services were worth; 60% believed
attorneys worked harder for rich clients than for poor ones; and 42% believed that attor-
neys were "'not concerned about the bad apples in the legal profession'." Schanberg, What
Price a Waiter's Life, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1980, at A27, col. 2. But see Mindes and Acock,
Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
177 (attorneys believe the public entertains a more unfavorable image of them than it actu-
ally does).
178. Gould, Beyond Burnout: You Can Withstand the Heat of Ambition, BARRISTER,
Summer 1983, at 4.
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ments are not indicated in the formal request for document pro-
duction. In that situation, an associate who is skilled in discovery
can interpret the document request as easily as can the partner.1 9
On the other hand, an associate should most often defer to the
decision of a partner regarding client billing.180
Probably the best practical advice for an associate faced with
what he believes are unethical instructions is to confront the part-
ner and explain the reasons that he believes the partner's instruc-
tions are unethical.' 8 ' At that point, the partner might agree with
the associate and withdraw his previous instructions. If the partner
does not relent, the next step for the associate is to discuss the
matter with a firm ethics committee or with a senior partner whom
the firm has designated as the partner responsible for supervising
ethical problems. 18 2 In the absence of such a committee or of a des-
ignated senior partner, the associate should discuss the matter
with another partner in the firm.'8 3 If the associate remains con-
vinced that the instruction is unethical and either that the matter
is not arguable or that the partner's resolution of the question is
not reasonable, Rule 5.2(b) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct does not permit the associate to acceed to the partner's
179. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), a senior part-
ner of the law firm representing Kodak ignored a whispered reminder from an associate of
the firm that a crucial document was still available. The trial judge subsequently initiated a
criminal investigation regarding the conduct of the senior partner. The partner ultimately
pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and was imprisoned for one month and "severe[ly] cen-
sured," though not disbarred, for failure to produce the document. Wessell, Institutional
Responsibility: Professionalism and Ethics, 60 NEa L. REv. 505, 506-09 (1981); New York
City Bar Unit Criticized Over Discipline, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 26, col. 2.
Because the associate decides under Model Rule 5.2(b) what is an "arguable question"
and what is a "reasonable question," Model Rule 5.2(b) could provide an associate who is
skilled in discovery with sufficient flexibility to determine whether to defer to the partner's
decision.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 205-06.
181. Seventy-two percent of the associates in the Illinois survey indicated that when they
disagree with a partner's ethical decision they generally discuss the matter with the partner
and reach an agreement. An additional 21% discuss the matter with the partner and some-
times disagree with the partner. Survey Responses to Question #18, Appendix; see also
Committee on Professional Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Op. 82-79 (1983).
182. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 comment (1983).
183. J. FREUND, LAWYERING-A REALISTIC APPROACH To LEGAL PRACTICE 113 (1979).
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instructions. In addition to refusing to obey the instructions, the
associate may be required to report the matter to the appropriate
bar association or court. 8 4 The following discussion offers common
situations in which the associate receives instructions from a law
firm partner that he believes are unethical.
1. Lack of Time or Expertise
A major difficulty for the law firm associate arises when a part-
ner assigns the associate to a job for which he lacks either the time,
the expertise, or the ability to acquire the expertise in the available
time. 8 5 Many associates, apparently fearful of crossing their em-
ployers, will make their best effort at what turns out to be an im-
possible task. Very few associates have sufficient confidence to tell
partners consistently that they are too busy to handle a matter or
that they do not have the time to acquire the expertise necessary
to do an adequate job on a project.' Lack of time, knowledge, or
184. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) & EC 1-4 (1981). Rule
8.3(a) of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not require that an associ-
ate report all ethical violations. It requires only that a lawyer report "a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1983). The comment to the Rule states that "substantial" refers to
the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer
is aware. Id. Rule 8.3 comment. The comment to Model Rule 8.3 adds that the old rule was
virtually unenforceable. Id. Thus, it was thought that a change was necessary to limit re-
porting to "those offenses that a self-regulating profession ... must vigorously endeavor to
prevent." Id. For further evidence that Disciplinary Rule 1-103 has become a dead letter,
see Brill, Wilkie Farr's Cover-up, The American Lawyer, Aug. 5, 1981, at 4 (the legal profes-
sion is reluctant to report disciplinary violations committed by fellow attorneys as required
by DR 1-103). In the "Wilkie Cover-up," partners of a major New York law firm dismissed
two associates for billing to clients of the firm's hours actually spent moonlighting by the
two attorneys. Id. According to Brill, such indifference to the demands of the Code makes a
mockery of a profession suppossedly representing to the public that it will uphold honor and
justice. Id.
185. Eighty-nine percent of the associates in the Illinois survey stated that at some time
they had felt that they lacked sufficient knowledge or expertise to handle an assignment.
Survey Responses to Question #21, Appendix. Eighty-three percent of the associates stated
that at some time they had felt that they lacked sufficient time to handle a particular as-
signment. Survey Responses to Question #24, Appendix.
186. Of those associates in the Illinois survey who felt that there were times when they
lacked sufficent knowledge or expertise to handle an assignment, 3% never expressed this
problem to the partner giving them the assignment, 28% expressed it rarely, and 57% ex-
pressed it only occassionally. Survey Responses to Question #22, Appendix. Similarly, of
those associates who felt that there were occasions when they lacked sufficient time to han-
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expertise may prevent the associate from performing the assign-
ment to his satisfaction. 1 7 Inferior work that is produced under
these conditions can produce liability for negligence on the part of
both the law firm and the associate to the client. Disciplinary ac-
tion against both the associate and the law firm for unethical con-
duct also is possible.
Although the law firm owes a fiduciary duty to the client, its
interest is not coextensive with the interest of the client insofar as
the firm seeks to maximize its own profit. The associate is essen-
tially trapped between his duty to the firm and his duty to the
client. Arguably, an associate confronts the dilemma of whether to
follow the instructions of the law firm or to serve what the associ-
ate believes are the best interests of the client only when the law
firm is acting unethically by placing its interest before the interest
of its client. In such a situation, the associate's duty to the client
under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and perhaps
his duty to the profession as a whole, should override his duty of
loyalty to the law firm.
One can envision a situation in which the law firm decides that
the associate has spent enough time on a matter and that the work
product is adequate. The associate might feel that the client has
not been served properly because the quality of the work is not
commensurate with the associate's capabilities. Below, I discuss
the issue of whether the associate is subject to civil or disciplinary
liability for negligence, because of his lack of time or expertise,
when acting under the direction of a partner who is or who should
be aware of the associate's problem.
dle an assignment, 9% never expressed this to a partner, 36% expressed it rarely, and 46%
expressed it only occasionally. Survey Responses to Question #25, Appendix.
187. Those associates who stated that there were occasions when they lacked knowledge
or expertise to handle an assignment were asked if their lack of knowledge or expertise when
they initially received an assignment prevented them from performing the assignment to
their satisfaction. The responses were as follows: never-28%, rarely-46%, occasionally-18%,
frequently-1%, and often-5%. Survey Responses to Question #23, Appendix.
Those associates who stated that there were occasions when they lacked sufficient time to
handle an assignment also were asked how often the lack of time to handle an assignment
prevented them from performing the assignment to their satisfaction. The responses were as
follows: never-12%, rarely-50%, occasionally-31%, frequently-2%, and often-4%. Survey
Responses to Question #26, Appendix.
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a. Civil Liability for the Associate's Negligence
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the law firm is liable
for the negligence of an associate when the associate is acting
within the scope of his employment.""' In addition, a law firm part-
ner can be independently liable for the negligence of one of its as-
sociates if the partner was negligent in instructing or supervising
the associate. 89 Thus, if a partner instructs an associate to re-
search the matter and to give him an answer in an hour, and the
partner knows or should know, or the associate tells him, that the
allotted time is insufficient to research the subject properly, the
partner is liable to the client for the associate's negligent perform-
ance of his task.
Correspondingly, the associate who lacks sufficient time to han-
dle a given assignment properly because the partner has over-
loaded him with work is nonetheless liable to the client for negli-
gent performance of that assignment.'8 " In short, lack of time or
expertise is not a sufficient excuse to relieve an associate of civil
liability, even if he is acting under the express direction of a law
firm partner.
b. Disciplinary Liability for the Associate's Negligence
An attorney may also be subject to discipline for neglecting a
matter, 191 for failing to prepare adequately,'92 or for handling a
188. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
189. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 20, § 35.
190. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2), (3)(1981); see
also In re Bartlett, 283 Or. 487, 584 P.2d 296 (1978); In re Reinmiller, 213 Or. 680, 325 P.2d
773 (1958); In re Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 N.W.2d 789 (1981) (the demands and pres-
sures of a busy practice were no excuse for an attorney's neglect of his client's needs).
191. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (1981); see Annot., 96
A.L.R. 2d 823 (1964). For the purpose of determining compliance with the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility, the ABA defines neglect as follows:
Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the obliga-
tions which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious disregard for
the responsibility owed to the client. The concept of ordinary negligence is
different. Neglect usually involves more than a single act or omission. Neglect
cannot be found if the acts or omissions complained of were inadvertent or the
result of an error of judgment made in good faith.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1273 (1973); see
Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 Drake L. Rev. 88, 107, 114-15 (1976-1977) (favors
clear distinction between the standard of care applicable in malpractice actions and that
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matter without possessing adequate legal knowledge and skill.19
Disciplinary problems arise when a partner assigns work to an as-
sociate, and the associate knows he lacks both the knowledge or
skill necessary to handle the matter competently and the time in
which to acquire such knowledge or skill. Similarly, an associate
who is unable to devote enough time to a matter because of other
cases assigned to him by the law firm might also be subject to dis-
cipline if he neglects' the matter.
Neither the current ethical rules, which are contained in the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, nor the proposed
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicate that an associ-
ate should be treated differently from partners regarding negligent
work. On the contrary, Official Note One to Disciplinary Rules 6-
101 and 6-102 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
suggests that every lawyer faces the complexities of modern prac-
tice and must struggle continually to maintain the requisite degree
of competence. 94
Similarly, Rule 5.2(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
applicable in determining violations of DR 1-101(A)(3)). Disciplinary actions based on an
attorney's neglect of his professional responsibilities to his client have "been generally lim-
ited to instances of misconduct involving 'indifference and a consistent failure to carry out
the obligations [the attorney] has assumed to his client or a conscious disregard for the
responsibility owed to his client."' LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA!
BNA) 31:202 (1984) (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal
Op. 335 n.1 (1974)).
192. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILiTY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1981). Grievances
against attorneys based on an attorney's neglect of a matter are by far the largest source of
complaint by clients against attorneys. Annual Report of the Committee on Grievances of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, cited in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) n.5 (1983).
193. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(1) (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1 & 1.3 (1983) (rules governing attorney compe-
tence and diligence). Model Rule 1.1 combines DR 6-101(A)(1), (2), and (3) by requiring a
lawyer to represent a client competently and by defining "competent representation" as
requiring "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." Id. Rule 1.1.
194. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 & 6-102 official note one
(1981); cf. id. DR 1-102(A)(2) ("a lawyer shall not circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through
actions of another"). This section makes it improper for an attorney to violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility indirectly by using his employees. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) comment; see also Weck-
stein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEx. L. REv.
267, 272 (1970).
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duct requires that an attorney follow the Rules of Professional
Conduct even though he acts at the direction of another. 195 As al-
ready noted, however, Rule 5.2(b) states that an associate does not
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if he acts in accordance
with a supervisory attorney's reasonable resolution of an arguable
question of professional duty.196 Nevertheless, the problems posed
by lack of time or by lack of expertise probably fall outside the
scope of those arguable questions to which the associate can defer
to the judgment of the law firm partner. In particular, the partner
is not in as good a position as the associate to know the associate's
own limitations. Moreover, the partner might not be able to judge
the situation as objectively as the associate. The partner's interest
in maximizing the profit of the law firm, which might be greater
than the interest of the associate who receives a fixed salary and
who is only indirectly affected by modest changes in the profits of
the firm, might diminish the partner's objectivity.
In sum, the associate is in a better position than the law firm
partner to evaluate his knowledge of a subject area and to evaluate
the time he has to devote to a problem. Therefore, in these situa-
tions, the associate should not escape liability merely because he
has followed the instructions of a partner. If the associate's con-
duct is an ethical violation, however, the tribunal that is determin-
ing the sanction for the associate's conduct might reduce the sever-
ity of the sanctions if the associate has followed the instructions of
a partner.'97
2. Excessive Billing for the Associate's Work
The associate's duty to the law firm can conflict with his duty to
the client in the area of fees. A law firm often bills on the basis of
the hourly rate of an attorney, which varies depending on the skill
and experience of the attorney and the overhead of the firm, multi-
plied by the number of hours the attorney spends on the task.198
195. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2(a) (1983).
196. Id. Rule 5.2(b).
197. See supra note 173.
198. Ackley, Let's Throw Out the Hourly Basis for Fees, 49 A.B.A.J. 76 (1963); Cantor,
Ethics & Economics in Hourly Fees, 50 A.B.A.J. 951 (1964); Fees and Billing, The Lawyer's
Handbook (ABA) C3-1 to C3-33 (1975); Gerhart, The Art of Billing Clients, LAW OFFICE
ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT MANUAL (Callaghan) § 25.0, Article B (June 1981); McCarty,
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The associate reports to the la~v firm the number of hours he works
on a particular matter. The law firm fixes the hourly billing rate of
the associate, 99 calculates the total fee, and makes any adjustment
that it considers appropriate.
The typical law firm requires that the associate bill from 1600 to
2000 hours per year.200 Therefore, the associate, in order to main-
tain his position, must find client matters for which he can bill the
necessary amount of time. Problems arise when the associate
spends some portion of the time on activity that is not productive
or when the associate has had an unproductive day and does not
perform at his usual level.2 01 The problems are compounded when
firms have policies requiring their associates to report all of the
time that they spend on a matter.0 2 These law firms make the ap-
propriate adjustments if they determine that the hours spent were
excessive because of the associate's experience, the billing rate, and
the complexity of the problem. Moreover, the associate's interest
in meeting his quota of billable hours is advanced if he reports all
of the hours that he works.
An ethical problem arises when the law firm fails to make the
appropriate adjustment when billing the client. Disciplinary Rule
2-106(A) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an arrange-
ment for a charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. 20 3 If
an associate knows that the law firm habitually fails to make the
appropriate adjustment in billing the client, he arguably is a par-
supra note 2; Merrell, The Calculation and Collection of Attorney's Fees, 1 L. OFF. ECON. &
MGMT., Aug. 1960, at 20.
199. At larger law firms in large cities, the hourly billing rate of the associate is roughly
equal to twice the associate's salary, divided by 1000. Thus, an associate earning $40,000 will
be billed out at about $80 per hour. Brill, The Law Firm of the Future, THE AM. LAWYER,
Nov. 1980, at 47; Cantor, Modern Drive Toward Cost-Effectiveness and Public Responsive-
ness, 14 F. 420, 421 (1979).
200. J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS 376 (1983). In a 1982 survey covering 2696 associates
with time records, the average of annual billable hours was 1723. Altman & Weil, The 1982
Survey of Law Firm Economics, 23 L. OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 351, 354 (1982).
201. In the Illinois survey the associates were asked how often they reduced the amount
of time they billed to a client because they were not as productive in the time spent as they
usually were. The responses were as follows: never-9%, rarely-14%, occasionally-46%, fre-
quently-13%, and often-18%. Survey Responses to Question #28, Appendix.
202. Forty-one percent of the associates who responded to the Illinois survey work for law
firms that have a policy requiring associates to bill to a client all the time they spend work-
ing for a client on a particular matter. Survey Responses to Question #27, Appendix.
203. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLiTY DR 2-106(A) (1981).
19851
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ticipant in an arrangement to charge an excessive fee.2" 4 On the
other hand, when the firm requires full reporting, both the associ-
ate's duty of loyalty and his self-interest dictate that he report all
the hours that he works on a particular matter.
In this type of situation, particularly if the associate is unsure
whether the fee is excessive, the associate usually should defer to
the decision of the partner or law firm. Both are generally posi-
tioned better than the associate to evaluate the factors specified in
Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) and to determine a reasonable fee.20 5 In
particular, the law firm can better evaluate the firm overhead, the
value of the service to the client, the fee customarily charged for
the service, and the difficulty of the questions.
A similar problem can arise if an associate feels that the work
that he performs on a matter is unnecessary or merely duplicates
the work of another associate. Again, the law firm or partner is in a
better position to evaluate the need for the associate's work and
the value of that work to the client. Furthermore, because the cli-
ent may refuse to pay for unnecessary work or takes his business
elsewhere, the market will judge the managerial abilities of the
partner who is handling the case.
204. See Los Angeles County Bar Association, Formal Op. 391 (1981) (it is fraudulent and
a means of charging unreasonable fees for a law firm to bill out secretarial and paralegal
time at the rate normally charged for an attorney), cited in LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) T 801:1704 (1984). The opinion further stated that an associate
who refuses to approve fraudulent billing cannot be discharged for that reason because such
conduct makes the participation in fraudulent conduct a condition of the associate's contin-
ued employment. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(2)
(1981).
205. Model Rule 1.5 is substantially similar to Disciplinary Rule 2-106. According to this
disciplinary rule, the following factors should be considered as guides in determining
whether a fee is excessive:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and the difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services.
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(b) (1981).
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If a firm's bills are regularly excessive, the firm will lose clients
to other firms that charge at a lower rate for the same quality of
service. Even though the market might protect clients in general,
individual clients can be hurt by excessive fees. Therefore, an asso-
ciate cannot defer to a partner or to the law firm on all billing
issues. In those situations in which the associate knows that the
firm is not adjusting properly the time that he submits, he can dis-
cuss the matter with the head of the firm's billing committee or
with some partner other than the one in charge of the billing. Ulti-
mately, even if the amount the firm bills the client is not the asso-
ciate's decision, and even if the associate cannot change the im-
proper billing by internal firm discussion, the associate is under an
obligation to report billing that he knows is excessive to the appro-
priate bar association fitness committee.20 6
V. CONCLUSION
The law firm associate owes fiduciary and contractual obligations
to the law firm that employs him,20 to the client on whose case he
is working, 208 and to the public.209 In resolving an associate's ethi-
cal problem, the associate's interest is important if the interests of
the client and the public are marginal or nonexistent, and if the
associate does not breach a fiduciary or a contractual obligation to
the law firm.210 In the absence of code provisions governing a spe-
cific issue, the courts should resolve the associate's ethical problem
by formulating rules that are based on the relative importance of
the interests in the particular situation. 1'
In formulating rules governing an associate's ethical behavior,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct employ the same mode of
analysis as found in prior case law: the Model Rules balance the
competing interests that are affected by the associate's conduct. 212
However, the Model Rules also have made some important sub-
206. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983).
207. See supra notes 1-39 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 93, 99-100, 120, 123 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 63-123 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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stantive changes, such as the removal of the allegedly ambiguous
"appearance of impropriety test." The changes could lower the at-
torney's ethical standards when the attorney's decision is
arguable.213
Model Rule 5.2(b) is also troublesome. This Rule absolves an as-
sociate of liability for ethical misconduct when he follows the argu-
able ethical decision of a law firm partner,214 but it fails to account
adequately for those situations in which the associate has more
knowledge or more expertise than the partner in a particular sub-
ject, and therefore is the better judge of an ethical issue.2 15 Model
Rule 5.2(b) also fails to consider situations in which an associate
may be more objective than a law firm partner.216 Finally, Model
Rule 5.2(b) could have the unintended effect of reducing the asso-
ciate's ability to make ethical decisions without fear of being
fired.21 7
213. See supra note 88, 140-41 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 173 and accompanying text
215. See supra notes 179-80, 196 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
The following survey was sent to 201 law firm associates in Illi-
nois. The associates' names were drawn from Martindale-Hub bell
Law Directory (11th ed. 1983). An effort was made to equate the
percentage of surveys sent to associates at various sized firms with
the percentage of similarly sized firms that are found in Illinois.
Thus, 84% of the surveys were sent to associates at firms with 1-10
attorneys, 13 % of the surveys were sent to associates at firms with
11-40 attorneys, and 3% of the surveys were sent to associates at
firms with more than 40 attorneys. As can be seen from the re-
sponse to question #2, the distribution of the firm size of the asso-
ciates actually responding to the survey was very similar to the dis-
tribution of the firm size of the associates who were mailed a copy
of the survey.
There were 112 surveys returned to the author; of those re-
turned, 110 were used. Two survey responses were counted even
though the respondents stated that since the 1983 edition of Mar-
tindale-Hubbell had been published, they were no longer associ-
ated with their respective firms. (These respondents stated that
they were answering the questions based solely on their experience
as associates.) In some instances, rounding prevents the total of
the responses from reaching 100%.
SURVEY
1. How old are you?
(a) 25 or under 2% (b) 26-29 33% (c) 30-35 48%
(d) 36-39 12% (e) 40 or over 5%
2. How many attorneys (partners and associates) are in your
firm?
(a) 1-10 82% (b) 11-40 12% (c) More than 40 6%
3. Does your law firm have a policy on your doing legal work
after hours for clients of your own ("moonlighting")?
(a) yes 54% (b) no 46%
4. If you answered yes to question #3 what is that policy:
(a) moonlighting is permitted 7%
(b) moonlighting is forbidden* 65%
(c) moonlighting is restricted 28%
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*(In a few circumstances, the associate's response to question
#5 showed that moonlighting was actually forbidden by his
law firm rather than restricted. Therefore, the survey re-
sponse was altered to be consistent with most associates who
described similar restrictions but answered question #4 by
stating that moonlighting was forbidden. For example, many
smaller firms permit the associate to work for whomever he
wants but the client is viewed as a client of the firm and the
associate is not considered to be moonlighting when working
for that client.)
5. If you answered (c) to question #4, briefly describe the nature
of the restrictions.
Responses included: "Must share profits with firm," "limited
to family," "limited to family and friends," "only if without
pay," "must not consume an inordinate amount of time,"
"cannot compete with firm," "only with permission of law
firm partner."
6. Do you ever moonlight (by doing legal work)?
(a) yes 41% (b) no 59%
7. If you answered "yes" to question #6, have you ever received
pay for moonlighting?
(a) yes 32% (b) no 68%
8. If you answered "yes" to question #6, have you ever moon-
lighted for anyone other than your family?
(a) yes 58% (b) no 42%
9. If you answered "yes" to question #6, have you ever moon-
lighted for anyone other than your family and friends?
(a) yes 11% (b) no 89%
10. Does your law firm have a policy on whether and to what ex-
tent you are permitted to invest in client securities (i.e.,
stocks, bonds, etc.)?
(a) yes 15% (b) no 85%
11. If you answered "yes" to question #10, what is that policy?
(a) investments are permitted 25 %
(b) investments are forbidden 37.5%
(c) investments are restricted 37.5%
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12. If you answered (c) to question #11, briefly describe that
policy:
Responses included: "nothing unethical or even approaching
violation of securities law," "permitted only with prior ap-
proval of principal or consultation with client," and "allowed
if a 'reputable' client."
13. Since you have been working for your law firm, have you ever
invested in any securities?
(a) yes 36% (b) no 64%
14. If you answered "yes" to question #13, what if anything, did
you do after making your decision to invest to find out if your
law firm had confidential information regarding the client
which, when made public, would likely influence the price of
the securities?
(a) nothing 63%
(b) checked files 6%.
(c) checked with partner 17%
(d) other (describe) 14%
15. If you answered "yes" to question #13, have you ever in-
vested in securities of a client of your law firm?
(a) yes 12% (b) no 88%
16. If you answered "yes" to question #15, have you ever pur-
chased the security of a client whose stock trades on other
than a national securities exchange?
(a) yes* 60% (b) no 40%
*(Several respondents incorrectly answered question #16 be-
cause inspection revealed that 10 people responded to ques-
tion #16, yet only 5 actually answered "yes" to question #15.
Therefore, the percentage was calculated using only those re-
sponses in which question #15 was actually answered "yes.")
17. Have you ever discussed an ethical problem with a partner?
(a) yes 98% (b) no 2%
18. If you answered "yes" to question #17, what do you generally
do when you disagree with a partner's ethical decision?
(a) nothing 4%
(b) Discuss with partner and usually we end up agreeing 72%
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(c) Discuss with partner and we end up disagreeing 2%
(d) Discuss with partner and sometimes we end up disagree-
ing 19%
(e) Withdraw from case 0%
(f) Other 4%
19. If you answered "yes" to question #17, have you ever with-
drawn from a case because of an ethical disagreement with a
partner?
(a) yes 14% (b) no 86%
20. In August 1983, the American Bar Association approved the
latest version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of
attorneys. (Model Rules do not become binding until adopted
by individual states.) Rule 5.2 of the Model Rules provides as
follows:
Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the di-
rection of another person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance
with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty.
What is your attitude regarding this provision:
(a) strongly disagree 7% (b) disagree 10%
(c) neutral 16% (d) agree 59%
(e) strongly agree 7 %
21. Have you ever felt you lacked sufficient knowledge or exper-
tise to handle an assignment?
(a) yes 89% (b) no If%
22. If you answered "yes" to question #21, how often have you
expressed to a partner that you thought you lacked sufficient
knowledge or expertise to handle an assignment?
(a) never 3 % (b) rarely 28 % (c) occasionally 57 %
(d) frequently 12%
23. If you answered "yes" to question #21, how often do you feel
that your lack of knowlege or expertise when you initially re-
ceived an assignment prevented you from performing the as-
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signment to your satisfaction?
(a) never 28% (b) rarely 46% (c) occasionally 19 %
(d) frequently 1% (e) often 5%
24. Have you ever felt that you lacked sufficient time to handle a
particular assignment?
(a) yes 83% (b) no 17%
25. If you answered "yes" to question #24, how often have you
expressed to a partner that you thought you lacked sufficient
time to handle an assignment?
(a) never 9% (b) rarely 36% (c) occasionally 46%
(d) frequently 7% (e) often 2%
26. If you answered "yes" to question #24, how often do you feel
that the lack of time you had to handle an assignment has
prevented you from performing the assignment to your
satisfaction?
(a) never 12% (b) rarely 50% (c) occasionally 31%
(d) frequently 2% (e) often 4%
27. Does your law firm have a policy requiring associates to bill to
a client all the time they spend working for a client on a par-
ticular matter?
(a) yes 41% (b) no 59%
28. How often do you reduce the amount of time you bill to a
client because you are not as productive in the time you spent
as you usually are?
(a) never 9% (b) rarely 14% (c) occasionally 46%
(d) frequently 13% (e) often 18%
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